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Abstract 
Background: The tendency to recall overgeneral memories (OGM) when cued 
to recall specific ones is characteristic of depression. A greater understanding 
of the cognitive processes underlying OGM may contribute towards more 
clinically effective assessment, prevention and treatment of depression (Moore 
& Zoellner, 2007). Self-coherence maintenance has been implicated as a 
process underlying OGM (Conway, 2005). 
Objectives: The purpose of this review was to determine whether self-
discrepancies are associated with OGM.  
Method: A search of 10 databases was conducted: Embase, PsychINFO, Web 
of Science®, Current Contents Connect®, MEDLINE®, BIOSIS Citation Index 
SM, Chinese Science Citation DatabaseSM, PsychARTICLES, Journals@OVID 
and Your Journals@OVID. The critique was guided by two checklists: the 
Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology 
(STROBE: Vandenbroucke et al., 2007; von Elm et al., 2007) and 
Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT: Moher et al., 2009, 
2010). 
Results: Fourteen studies across 10 papers were identified in the review. 
Methodological variation made between-paper comparisons difficult. 
Additionally, small, predominantly female samples were used, limiting 
generalisability.  
Conclusions: Evidence for a positive association between self-discrepancies 
and OGM was generally consistent amongst currently depressed and 
previously depressed individuals and non-clinical samples at the within- and 
between-person level. This association was stronger amongst clinical 
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populations at the between-person level. Findings offer support for the self-
maintenance coherence hypothesis of OGM as suggested by Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000), which is a normative model of autobiographical 
memory (AM) retrieval. Findings suggest that OGM may represent an extreme 
form of normal AM functioning amongst previously depressed (PD) and 
currently depressed (CD) individuals. Further research testing this theoretical 
assumption is required before clinical interventions can be informed. 
Keywords: Autobiographical memory, depression, overgeneral memory, self-
discrepancy. 
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Introduction 
Autobiographical memory (AM) has been defined as memory for 
personally experienced past events that contributes to individuals’ sense of 
self and ability to pursue goals (Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Williams et al., 2007). 
The tendency for currently depressed (CD) and previously depressed (PD) 
individuals to recall overly generalised AMs when asked to retrieve specific 
ones has been termed “overgeneral memory” (OGM; Williams et al., 2007). 
For example, in response to the cue word “happy” a specific AM might be 
“Last Monday morning when I had a picnic in the sunshine with my best 
friend”. An OGM response might instead be “I never feel happy”. OGM has 
been theorised to result from cognitive processes operating when 
autobiographical remembering may threaten self-coherence (Conway, 2005). 
This review investigated whether discrepancies that threaten self-coherence 
are associated with OGM. 
The Self and Goals 
The meaning of the term “self” is commonly thought to be synonymous 
with identity and to refer to enduring yet dynamic representations about 
oneself including beliefs, memories and goals (James, 1890; Swann & 
Bosson, 2010). The term “self-regulation” refers to how individuals control and 
direct their behaviour in relation to the setting and attainment of goals 
(Bandura, 1977, 1986; Kanfer, 1970; Locke, 1968). Goals can be defined as 
desired future self-states which motivate individuals to reduce perceived 
discrepancies between these and the current self-state (Austin & Vancouver, 
1996; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Carver & Scheier, 1982, 1998). Within 
Higgins’s (1987) self-discrepancy theory “self-guides” are consistent with the 
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concept of goals. Self-guides include representations of future as well as 
current, “actual”, self-states. The “ideal self” represents beliefs about 
aspirations and hopes and the “ought self” about obligations and 
responsibilities. Discrepancies between actual-ideal (A-I) self-guides, have 
been found to result in depressive symptoms including failure, disappointment 
and shame and discrepancies between actual-ought (A-O) self-guides to result 
in guilt and anxiety (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985; Higgins, Strauman, & 
Klein, 1986). Carver, Lawrence and Scheier (1999) later proposed the “feared 
self”, suggesting that discrepancies between actual-feared (A-F) self-guides 
are a better predictor of guilt and anxiety than discrepancies between A-O self-
guides, which, they proposed, only become relevant when avoidant motives 
are low. Similar theories include Markus and Nurius’s (1986) notion of 
“possible selves” which represents ideas about what individuals could become 
whereby discrepancies between current and desired future selves have been 
found to motivate approach and discrepancies between current and feared 
future selves to motivate avoidance (Oyserman, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-
Johnson, 2004).  
Autobiographical Memory 
By reducing self-discrepancies individuals seek to promote self-
coherence: a reassuring sense of self-continuity and predictability (Barclay, 
1996; Brooks, Swann, & Mehta, 2011; Ryan & Deci, 2002). Self-coherence 
can also be achieved through the construction of AM (Bluck, 2003; Bluck & 
Alea, 2002; Pillemer, 2003). Discrepancies between representations of the self 
in the past and present can threaten coherence and ability to operate 
effectively (Conway, 2005). It has been suggested that individuals may alter or 
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bias recall of the past in order to promote self-coherence (Swann & Bosson, 
2010; Wilson & Ross, 2003). Conway, Meares and Standart (2004a) propose 
that by retaining information in an abstract or conceptual, rather than detailed 
format, AM can provide a compromise for the tension that results from needing 
to both give an accurate enough record of goal-progress to inform self-
regulation as well as provide a coherent sense of self through time. 
Overgeneral Memories and the Self-memory System 
OGM is clinically important because it has been found to predict 
depressive symptomology (Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Mackinger, Pachinger, 
Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000) and has been associated with poor prognosis 
and longer recovery times (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; 
Sumner, Griffith, & Mineka, 2010). According to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s 
(2000) self-memory system model (SMS), retrieval of AM involves the 
activation of information that is hierarchically organised across three levels of 
specificity. At the most general level, individuals’ lifetime periods are large 
units of time that reflect particular overarching goals, e.g., “When I lived with 
John”. More specific are general events, defined as categories of events, e.g., 
“Holidays in Spain”. Event specific knowledge (ESK) represents sensory-
perceptual details of particular events (Conway, 2001), e.g., “Seeing that red 
dress when I went to Sarah’s party last Saturday”. According to Conway and 
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) OGM represents the retrieval of AMs from the general 
event level of specificity due to truncation of the retrieval process. 
Self-coherence Maintenance 
Within the SMS, formation of specific AM requires coordinated retrieval 
of non-immediate self-knowledge, including goals and self-guides, and 
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sensory-perceptual information. Here, in accordance with theories of self-
regulation (Zimmerman, 2000), goals are conceptualised as representations 
through which individuals assess and attempt to reduce discrepancies 
between perceived current and standard or ideal self-states (Conway, Singer, 
& Tagini, 2004b). Goals are processed at more abstract levels than sensory-
perceptual information. According to the SMS, if a specific AM represents an 
event that is discrepant from current goals, its retrieval is likely to cause a high 
degree of self-discrepancy and therefore information processing is re-directed 
to this more abstract level in order to maintain self-coherence (Conway et al., 
2004b; Conway, 2005). This aborts the hierarchical search process for a 
specific AM at the general event level, which can result in OGM (Conway et 
al., 2004b). From herein this will be termed the self-coherence maintenance 
hypothesis (S-CMH).  
The Autobiographical Memory Test 
The majority of research investigating OGM has used the AM test 
(AMT; Willliams & Broadbent, 1996). This method requires participants to 
produce a specific AM within 60 seconds of being presented with each of a 
series of cue words. The standard AMT cue set includes both positively and 
negatively valenced adjectives (van Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). Variations 
include the minimal instruction AMT (MI-AMT; Debeer, Hermans, & Raes, 
2009) in which participants are not explicitly told that the AM has to be 
specific. The MI-AMT has been found be a more sensitive and valid instrument 
to detect OGM in non-clinical samples (Griffith et al., 2009). Debeer et al. 
(2009) suggest that this is because such samples, which are usually students, 
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tend to have high executive functioning skills which enable them to follow 
instructions accurately, thereby creating a ceiling effect using the AMT.  
Summary 
Self-regulation involves the reduction of discrepancies between 
perceived current and future self-states, or goals (Markus & Wurf, 1987). AM 
informs self-regulation by corresponding to experience via the provision of a 
record of the self in the past and therefore goal-progress (Conway, 2005; 
McLean, Pasupathi, & Pals, 2007). It has been suggested that to satisfy a 
need for self-coherence individuals may distort the way in which they construct 
AM (Conway, 2005; Greenwald, 1980). According to Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce (2000), if specific to-be-remembered information is likely to cause self-
discrepancy, individuals are more likely to process information at a lower level 
of specificity, thereby resulting in the failure to access ESK, i.e., OGM. The 
aim of this review was to explore the empirical evidence regarding whether 
individuals with greater self-discrepancies are more overgeneral than 
individuals with smaller self-discrepancies (between-person) and whether 
individuals are more overgeneral in relation to AM cues to which they are more 
self-discrepant, compared to cues to which they are less self-discrepant 
(within-person).  
Research Question 
“Are self-discrepancies, at the within- and between-person level, 
associated with OGM?” 
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Method 
Search Terms 
Participants included in the search were adults and adolescents 
because OGM has been found within these populations. Older adults were 
excluded because older age has been associated with increased AM 
specificity; this population tends to be investigated separately within existing 
OGM literature (e.g., Ricarte, Latorre, Navarro, Aguilar, & Serrano, 2011). 
Older age is usually defined within psychological literature as age 65 years 
and above (e.g., Laidlaw, 2001; Gustafson et al., 2013). Exclusion criteria 
included dementia because this degenerative process impairs AM encoding 
and retrieval (Glosser, Gallo, Clark, & Grossman, 2002). Table 1 shows 
participant, manipulation/predictor and OGM outcome criteria. 
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Table 1 
Participant, Manipulation/Predictor and Outcome Criteria 
 Inclusion criteria Exclusion 
criteria 
Participants  (OAP* OR old* 
OR “old* ag*” 
OR aging OR 
ageing OR 
elder* OR 
Alzheimer* OR 
dementi*) 
Manipulations (“*discrepan*” OR “*concordan*” OR 
“*discordan*” OR “*congru*” OR “*coheren*” 
OR “*dissonan*” OR “*dispara*” OR “*diverg*” 
OR “*conflict*” OR “*clash*” OR 
“*incompatible” OR “*inconsisten*” OR 
“ideal*sel*” OR “ought*sel*” OR “feared*sel*” 
OR “actual*sel*” OR “ideal sel*” OR “ought 
sel*” OR “feared sel*” OR “actual sel*” OR 
goal* OR “possible*sel*” OR “possible sel*” 
OR “self-relevan*” OR “self relevan*” OR “self 
guide*” OR “self-guide*”) 
 
Outcomes (“autobiographical knowledge” OR 
“autobiographical memor*” OR OGM OR 
“over*general memor*” OR “over general 
memor*” OR “over*general autobiographical 
memor*” OR “over*general autobiographical 
knowledge” OR “over general 
autobiographical memor*” OR “over general 
autobiographical knowledge” OR “memory 
specificity” OR “specificity of memory” OR 
AMT OR MI-AMT OR “minimal*instruction 
autobiographical memory test” OR “minimal 
instruction autobiographical memory test”) 
 
 
Search and Screening Procedures 
Ten databases were searched; Embase, PsychINFO, Web of 
Science®, Current Contents Connect®, MEDLINE®, BIOSIS Citation Index SM, 
Chinese Science Citation DatabaseSM, PsychARTICLES, Journals@OVID and 
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Your Journals@OVID. All search string characters were altered to suit each 
database’s use of Boolean operators and each set of search criteria was 
separated by the word “AND”. All searches were conducted in the “title” and 
“abstract” fields to ensure that retrieved literature addressed the key concepts 
of the research question. Articles published up to September 2015 were 
included to ensure up-to-date results. This search strategy yielded 939 
articles; reference lists were then individually examined for additional articles 
of relevance. This yielded two articles, giving 941 in total (Figure 1). Firstly, 
duplicate records, conference abstracts, meetings and editorials were 
removed (n = 279). The following specifications were applied when examining 
the titles and abstracts (a) English-language publication; (b) human sample; 
(c) published in a peer reviewed journal; (d) exclusion of older adult 
participants; (e) exclusion of studies that did not primarily address the 
relationship between self- or goal- discrepancies and OGM. Based on these 
criteria, 651 articles were excluded. Of the remaining 11 articles, a further one 
was excluded that did not focus explicitly on self-or goal-discrepancy, leaving 
a total of 10 articles. Quantitative and qualitative papers were included. Purely 
theoretical papers were excluded. 
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Figure 1. Identification process of articles. 
 
Database search results 
 
Athens: Embase and PsycINFO) 
search results titles and abstracts (n 
= 293) 
 
Web of Knowledge: Web of 
Science®, Current Contents 
Connect®, MEDLINE®, BIOSIS 
Citation Index SM and Chinese 
Science Citation DatabaseSM (n 
=610) 
 
OVID: PsychARTICLES, 
Journals@OVID and Your 
Journals@OVID (n = 36) 
 
Total = 939 
 
Articles identified via 
references of retrieved 
articles and reading general 
literature related to the search 
topic (n = 2) 
 
662 remaining records after duplicates, abstracts, meetings and editorials and 
conferences (n = 279) removed 
662 remaining record title 
and abstracts screened 
 
 
651 records excluded for 
ineligibility e.g., studies that 
did not primarily address the 
relationship between self- or 
goal- discrepancies and OGM 
or purely theoretical papers 
 
 
 
11 remaining full‐text 
articles assessed for 
eligibility 
 
 
1 of full‐text articles excluded 
because self-discrepancy was 
not explicit focus 
 
10 articles eligible for inclusion in the review 
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Evaluation Criteria  
In order to guide this critique two checklists were referred to: the 
Strengthening the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology 
(STROBE: Vandenbroucke et al., 2007; von Elm et al., 2007) and 
Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT: Moher et al., 2009, 
2010). These were used to inform discussion of the quality of the articles 
rather than to exclude studies based on suboptimal quality because they were 
not designed to be used as assessment tools (da Costa, Cevallos, Altman, 
Rutjes, & Egger, 2011). 
Results 
Ten articles which met full inclusion criteria were deemed eligible for 
this review (Table 2). Moberly and MacLeod (2006) published findings from 
three studies. Schoofs, Hermans and Raes (2012) and Schoofs, Hermans, 
Griffith and Raes (2013) each published findings from two studies. This 
resulted in a total of 14 studies across 10 articles.  
Participants  
Papers included a total of 868 participants, the majority of whom were 
female (73.6%). Schoofs et al. (2012) did not report the number of female 
participants. Studies predominately recruited adults with a mean age of over 
18 years and under 60 years. Six recruited from university student populations 
and three from secondary school populations. Some studies included 
participants from more than one population including: never depressed (NDs, 
n = 3), PDs (n = 4), CDs (n = 2), not assessed for current or previous 
depression (n = 10) and borderline personality disorder (BPD, n = 1).  
 
  20 
Table 2 
Key Findings and Effect Sizes, Sample Characteristics, Design, Self-Discrepancy Operationalisation and Outcome Measures  
Reference OGM op  Sample  n  
(% f) 
M 
age 
(SD) 
Design  S-D op 
(idiographic 
or 
nomothetic) 
AM 
outcome 
measures 
Key findings and effect sizes 
Moberly & 
MacLeod 
(2006) 
        
 
 
 
Study 1 Retrieval 
latencies for 
spec AMs 
recalled. 
UG 
students 
36 
(80.5) 
21.6 
(7.2) 
Quasi-ex. Self-
concordant 
and non-
self-
concordant 
goals 
(idiographic 
and 
nomothetic) 
GCP; stim 
pres = cues 
aloud, time 
lim = 60s, 
responses = 
audio 
recorded. 
 
Spec AMs were retrieved 
significantly faster in response 
to cues selected by 
participants from a pre-existing 
list as representing their goals, 
compared to cues not selected 
by participants as representing 
their goals i.e., non-goals, 2
p = 
.15. There was no significant 
difference in mean retrieval 
latency for spec AMs prompted 
by pre-selected and 
idiographic goals self-rated as 
self-concordant, compared to 
goals self-rated as non-self-
concordant, including after 
controlling for self-rated goal 
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commitment, difficulty, self-
efficacy and thought 
frequency, 2
p  = .01. 
 
Study 2 Retrieval 
latencies for 
positive 
responses 
(i.e., whether 
or not goal-
related event 
been 
experienced) 
UG 
students 
36 
(75) 
21.1 
(5.7) 
Quasi-ex. Self-
concordant 
and non-
self-
concordant 
goals 
(nomothetic) 
GCP; stim 
pres = comp 
screen, time 
lim = 4s, 
responses = 
computer 
keys 
pressed by 
participants. 
  
GEK was retrieved significantly 
faster in response to pre-
existing goal cues representing 
general events than in 
response to pre-existing non-
goal cues representing general 
events, 2
p  = .29. GEK was 
retrieved significantly faster in 
response to those goal-cues 
participant-rated as self-
concordant, compared to goal-
cues participant-rated as non-
self-concordant, 2
p =.36.  
 
Study 3 No. spec 
AMs retrieved 
in response 
to goal 
striving cues 
UG 
students 
36 
(75) 
19.5 
(1.4) 
Quasi-ex. Self-
concordant 
and non-
self-
concordant 
goals 
(idiographic) 
GCP; stim 
pres = cues 
on cards, 
time lim = 
90s, 
responses = 
audio 
recorded 
and written 
verbatim.  
 
No significant difference 
between no. spec AMs cued 
by idiographic self-concordant 
strivings compared to non-self-
concordant strivings, d = .09.  
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Barnhofer, 
Crane, 
Spinhoven, 
& Williams 
(2007) 
No. spec 
AMs retrieved 
PDs and 
NDs 
35 
(60) 
32.1 
(12.7) 
Corr. Dysfunction
al attitudes* 
(nomothetic) 
AMT; stim 
pres = cues 
aloud and 
comp 
screen, time 
lim = 30s, 
responses = 
audio 
recorded. 
In response to AMT cues 
thematically related to the 
dysfunctional attitude*, “need 
for approval”, PDs retrieved 
significantly fewer spec AMs 
under conditions of comprised 
executive control, compared to 
NDs, d = -.16. There was no 
significant relationship 
between no. spec AMs 
retrieved in response to AMT 
cue words related to the 
dysfunctional attitude 
“performance evaluation” 
amongst PDs compared to 
NDs, d = -.07. There was no 
significant relationship 
between no. spec AMs 
retrieved in response to 
standard AMT cues, not 
thought to be related to 
dysfunctional attitudes. Effect 
sizes unavailable. 
 
Crane, 
Barnhofer, 
& Williams 
(2007) 
No. spec 
AMs retrieved 
PDs and 
NDs 
44 
(50.1) 
33, 
(12.6) 
Corr.  A-O, A-I and 
A-F S-G-Ds 
(idiographic) 
 
AMT; stim 
pres = cues 
aloud and 
comp 
screen, time 
lim = 30s, 
Amongst PDs there was a 
significant negative correlation 
between no. of self-relevant 
AMT cues (i.e., that matched 
idiographic self-guides) and 
no. spec AMs retrieved, r = -
  23 
responses = 
audio 
recorded 
and written 
verbatim. 
 
.69. Amongst NDs there was 
no significant correlation 
between cue self-relevance 
and AM specificity, r = .07.  
Amongst PDs, no. of self-
relevant cues presented was 
also significantly negatively 
correlated with no. spec AMs 
retrieved in response to non-
self-relevant cues, r = -.76. 
Amongst NDs, the presence of 
self-relevant cues had no 
significant impact on specificity 
to non-relevant cues, r = -.18.  
 
Raes, 
Schoofs, 
Griffith, & 
Hermans 
(2012) 
 
No. spec and 
no. cat AMs 
retrieved. 
PDs 50, 
(82) 
30.3, 
(14.1) 
Corr. S-D 
man: 
positive 
single-
words 
rated in 
relation to 
A-I self-
guides 
A-I S-G-Ds 
(nomothetic) 
 
AMT; stim 
pres = cues 
aloud, time 
lim = 60s, 
responses = 
written 
verbatim. 
Amongst PDs higher levels of 
rumination were significantly 
correlated with a smaller no. 
spec AMs retrieved in 
response to AMT cues 
following, but not before, a S-
G-D induction whereby 
participants were asked to rate 
how closely positive single-
word characteristics 
corresponded to their actual 
and ideal selves, r = -.3.  
 
Schoofs, 
Hermans, & 
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Raes (2012) 
 
Study 1 Proportions 
of spec/cat 
AMs retrieved 
(no. spec/ cat 
and ext AMs 
divided by 
total no. 
responses) 
Secondary 
school 
students 
126 
(n/a.) 
17.57 
(0.66) 
Quasi-ex. A-I S-G-Ds 
(nomothetic) 
MI-AMT; 
stim pres = 
cues aloud, 
time lim = 
60s, 
responses = 
written by 
participants. 
 
A significantly greater 
proportion of spec AMs were 
retrieved in response to low- 
compared to high-discrepant 
cues using the MI-AMT, after 
controlling for depressive 
symptoms, d = -.27. A 
significantly greater proportion 
of cat AMs were retrieved in 
response to high- compared to 
low-discrepant cues, after 
controlling for depressive 
symptoms, d = .50.  
 
Study 2 Proportions 
of spec/cat 
AMs retrieved 
(no. spec/ cat 
and ext AMs 
divided by 
total no. 
responses) 
Secondary 
school 
students 
146 
(n/a.) 
16.82 
(0.72) 
Quasi-ex. A-I S-G-Ds 
(nomothetic) 
MI-AMT; 
stim pres = 
cues aloud, 
time lim = 
60s, 
responses = 
written by 
participants. 
 
A significantly greater 
proportion of spec AMs were 
retrieved in response to low- 
compared to high-discrepant 
cue words using the MI-AMT, 
after controlling for depressive 
symptoms, d = .58. A 
significantly smaller proportion 
of cat AMs were retrieved in 
response to low- compared to 
high-discrepant cue words, 
after controlling for depressive 
symptoms, d = .42.  
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Van den 
Broeck, 
Claes, 
Pieters, & 
Raes (2012) 
 
Proportion of 
spec/cat AMs 
retrieved 
(details of 
calculation 
n/a.) 
In-patients 
diagnosed 
with BPD 
 
34, 
(79.4) 
27.2 
(9.1) 
Corr. A-I, A-O and 
A-F S-G-Ds 
(nomothetic) 
AMT; stim 
pres = n/a., 
time lim = 
n/a., 
responses = 
written by 
participants. 
Amongst CDs, but not non-
depressed individuals, cue 
discrepancy (i.e., to what 
degree the AMT as a whole 
was independently rated as 
synonymous and discrepant 
with participants’ idiographic 
self-guides, respectively) was 
significantly negatively 
associated with proportion of 
spec AMs retrieved using the 
AMT, r = -.89. Amongst non-
depressed individuals, but not 
CDs, discrepancy was 
significantly negatively 
associated with proportion of 
cat AMs retrieved using the 
AMT, r = -.19.  
 
Schoofs, 
Hermans, 
Griffith, & 
Raes (2013) 
 
        
 
Study 1 Proportional 
indices of 
spec/cat AMs 
(raw no. of 
spec/ cat 
AMs divided 
UG 
students 
(currently 
non-
depressed) 
43 
(90.7) 
18.7 
(1.7) 
Ex. S-D 
man: 
positive 
single-
words 
rated in 
A-I S-G-Ds 
(nomothetic) 
MI-AMT; 
stim pres = 
cues aloud, 
time lim = 
60s, 
responses = 
In response to AMT cues there 
was no significant difference in 
AM specificity between those 
who received a S-D induction 
(whereby participants were 
asked to rate how closely 
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by total no. 
cues minus 
total no. 
omissions) 
relation to 
A-I self-
guides. 
recorded 
verbatim. 
positive single-word 
characteristics corresponded 
to their actual and ideal selves) 
compared to those who did not 
when specificity was 
operationalised as proportion 
of spec AMs retrieved, d = -
.10, or proportion of cat AMs 
retrieved, d = .7. 
 
Study 2 Proportional 
indices of 
spec/cat AMs 
(raw no. of 
spec/ cat 
AMs divided 
by total no. 
cues minus 
total no. 
omissions) 
 
CD 
inpatients 
26 
(80.7) 
42.9 
(11.1) 
Ex. S-D 
man: 
positive 
single-
words 
rated in 
relation to 
A-I self-
guides. 
A-I S-G-Ds 
(nomothetic) 
AMT; stim 
pres = cues 
aloud, time 
lim = 60s, 
responses = 
recorded 
verbatim. 
In response to AMT cues there 
was no significant difference in 
AM specificity between those 
who received a S-D induction 
(whereby participants were 
asked to rate how closely 
positive single-word 
characteristics corresponded 
to their actual and ideal selves) 
compared to those who did not 
when specificity was 
operationalised as proportion 
of spec AMs retrieved, d = -
.01, or proportion of cat AMs 
retrieved, d = .07. 
 
Smets, 
Griffith, 
Wessel, 
Walschaerst
No. spec/cat 
AMs 
retrieved. 
Secondary 
school 
students 
123 
(55) 
17.3 
(0.5) 
Ex. S-D 
man: 
positive 
single-
A-I S-G-Ds 
(nomothetic) 
MI-AMT; 
stim pres = 
cues aloud, 
time lim = 
Depressive symptomology was 
significantly negatively 
associated with no. spec AMs 
following a S-D induction 
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, & Raes 
(2013) 
 
words 
rated in 
relation to 
A-I self-
guides. 
 
60s, 
responses = 
written by 
participants. 
 
(whereby participants were 
asked to rate how closely 
positive single-word 
characteristics corresponded 
to their actual and ideal 
selves), after controlling for no. 
spec AMs before the induction, 
r = -.19. Depressive 
symptomology was 
significantly positively 
associated with no. cat AMs 
following the S-D induction, 
after controlling for no. cat AMs 
before the induction, r = .19. 
 
Ono & 
Devilly 
(2013) 
No. of spec/ 
general (cat 
and ext, 
including 
negative and 
threat) AMs 
retrieved.  
UG 
students 
(58.3% 
reported a 
previous 
emotional 
difficulty, of 
which 
45.2% 
reported 
PD) 
 
72 
(74.3) 
21.3 
(6.8) 
Corr. S-D 
man: A-I, 
A-O and 
A-F S-G-
Ds rated 
for how 
much 
they 
bothered 
participan
ts.  
A-I, A-O and 
A-F S-G-Ds. 
Differences 
between 
ideal or pre-
existing 
sense of 
self 
resulting 
from trauma 
exposure 
(Idiographic) 
 
AMT; stim 
pres = 
written 
cues, time 
lim = 30s, 
responses = 
written by 
participants. 
In response to AMT cues 
magnitude and appraisal of A-
F self-similarity significantly 
predicted number of negative 
general AMs, R2 = .14, and 
general threat AM, R2 = .26. 
Wessel, 
Postma, 
No. spec 
AMs 
PDs and 
NDs 
61 
(100) 
39.4 
(7.5) 
Corr. A-I and A-F 
S-G-Ds 
AMT; stim 
pres = cues 
Participants (PDs and NDs) 
retrieved a significantly greater 
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Huntjens, 
Crane, 
Smets, 
Zeeman, & 
Barnhofer 
(2014) 
retrieved. (idiographic) on cards, 
time lim = 
30s, 
responses = 
n/a. 
no. spec AMs in response to 
affective AMT cues compared 
to ideographically self-
discrepant cues (ideal self-
guides with the lowest and 
feared self-guides with the 
highest participant-ratings of 
similarity to their actual self), d 
= .60.  
Note. *differences between self-imposed actual and ideal standards resulting from perceived failures to meet needs deriving from 
dysfunctional attitudes, thought to reflect maladaptive schemata. %f = percentage female;  AM = autobiographical memory; AMT = 
autobiographical memory test; A-F = actual-feared; A-I = actual-ideal; A-O = actual-ought; BPD = borderline personality disorder; 
CDs = currently depressed individuals; comp screen = computer screen; corr. = correlational; ex = experimental; GCP = goal cueing 
paradigm; GEK = general event knowledge; M age = mean age; MI-AMT = minimal instruction autobiographical memory test; n/a. = 
not available; NDs = never depressed individuals; no. cat = number of categoric; no. ext. = number of extended; no. spec = number 
of specific; OGM = overgeneral memory; OGM op = OGM operationalisation; PDs = previously depressed individuals; quasi-ex = 
quasi experimental; SD = standard deviation; S-D= self-discrepancy; S-D op = self-discrepancy operationalisation; S-G-D = self-
guide discrepancy; stim pres = stimulus presented as; time lim = time limit; UG = undergraduate. 
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Definitional and Related Methodological Problems 
Self-discrepancy conceptualisation. All 14 studies conceptualised 
self-discrepancies as representing threats to self-coherence. Moberly and 
MacLeod (2006) investigated goals, which represent self-discrepancies, 
versus non-goals and whether both idiographic and (mainly) nomothetic goals 
were self-concordant or non-self-concordant i.e., goal motivation aligned and 
not aligned with the self, respectively. Ten of the remaining 11 studies defined 
self-discrepancies as differences between perceived current selves and self-
guides: A-O, A-I and A-F self-guide discrepancies (n = 3), A-I and A-F self-
guide discrepancies (n = 1) and A-I self-guide discrepancies (n = 6). Four of 
these utilised self-guides that were generated by participants (Crane, 
Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007; Ono & Devilly, 2013; Wessel et al., 2014; van 
den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, & Raes, 2012) and six studies provided 
participants with self-guides that had been generated prior to the study (Raes, 
Schoofs, Griffith, & Hermans, 2012; Schoofs et al., 2012; Schoofs et al., 2013; 
Smets, Griffith, Wessel, Walschaerst, & Raes, 2013). Finally, Barnhofer, 
Crane, Spinhoven, and Williams (2007) conceptualised self-discrepancies as 
differences between perceived current and self-imposed standards of 
performance; thought to reflect rigidly held dysfunctional attitudes. 
Overgeneral memory operationalisation. Seven out of the 14 studies 
reviewed measured OGM using the AMT (Table 2). Types of AMT cues 
included the standard set (n = 1), nomothetic words rated as more likely 
(“high-discrepant”) or unlikely (“low-discrepant”) to induce self-discrepancy (n 
= 1), words derived from participants’ self-generated A-I, A-O, A-F self-guides 
(n = 1), nomothetic dysfunctional attitude-related words (n = 1) and nomothetic 
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words thought likely to cause A-O, A-I and A-F self-comparisons (n = 2) and A-
I self-comparisons (n = 1). Four studies used the MI-AMT. Cue types included 
nomothetic high-discrepant and low-discrepant words (n = 2) and nomothetic 
words rated as likely to induce A-I self comparisons (n = 2). Moberly and 
MacLeod’s (2006) three studies employed goal cueing paradigms. These 
differed from the AMT in that the cue words used to elicit AMs were derived 
from both idiographic and (mainly) nomothetic goals. Studies operationalised 
OGM at particular levels of specificity, including latency of specific AM recall (n 
= 1), latency of general (including categoric and extended) AM recall (n = 1), 
number of specific AMs retrieved (n = 4), number of specific versus categoric 
AMs retrieved (n = 2), number of specific versus general (including categoric 
and extended) AMs retrieved (n = 1) and proportion of specific versus 
categoric AMs retrieved (n = 5). 
Design 
Studies were correlational (n = 6), experimental (n = 3) and quasi-
experimental (n = 5). 
Theoretical and Research Findings 
This review has been structured thematically to reflect the 
conceptualisation of self-discrepancy and sample characteristics of the 
studies.  
Discrepancy of Nomothetic Goals  
Eight studies elicited discrepancies of nomothetic goals. Barnhofer et 
al. (2007) propose that rigidly held attitudes whereby people self-impose high 
performance standards can be dysfunctional because perceived discrepancies 
between these and current performance are likely to be detected. The authors 
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found that in response to AMT cues thought to reflect the dysfunctional 
attitude, “need for approval”, PDs retrieved fewer specific AMs, compared to 
NDs. This between-person relationship was not detected in response to 
standard AMT cues. Raes et al. (2012) found higher levels of rumination to be 
associated with fewer specific AMs following, but not before, a self-
discrepancy induction whereby PDs were asked to rate how closely a list of 
pre-selected characteristics matched their A-I self-guides. The use of a self-
discrepancy induction in addition to AMT cues presumed to induce self-
discrepant focus increased the likelihood that self-discrepancy was activated. 
Therefore, this finding strengthens the evidence provided by Barnhofer et al. 
(2007) for a positive association between nomothetic self-discrepancies and 
OGM amongst clinical samples. These moderate associations (Cohen, 1992) 
provide evidence at the within- and between-person level. 
Conversely, Schoofs et al.’s (2013) study 2 found no difference in the 
proportion of specific or categoric AMs retrieved between CDs who received a 
self-discrepancy induction and those who did not. Like Raes et al. (2012), 
Schoofs et al. (2013) used self-discrepancy inductions in addition to self-
discrepant AMT cues. This consideration along with Schoofs et al.’s (2013) 
null findings weakens the evidence for a positive association between 
nomothetically conceptualised self-discrepancies and OGM amongst clinical 
samples, at the between-person level.   
Three of the eight studies which elicited discrepancies of nomothetic 
goals utilised the MI-AMT, which Griffith et al. (2012) suggest measures 
memory style, or the tendency to retrieve AMs in a more or less specific way, 
rather than the ability to retrieve specific AMs, which the AMT is thought to 
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measure (Dalgleish et al., 2007). The absence of participant instructions and 
therefore decrease in executive functioning demands, may increase the 
sensitivity of the MI-AMT to detect an OGM retrieval style (Griffith et al., 2012). 
Thus, these studies might reflect more valid measures of OGM. 
Schoofs et al. (2012) and Smets et al. (2013) found evidence for a 
positive association between nomothetic self-discrepancies and OGM 
amongst secondary school students. Using quasi-experimental designs 
Schoofs et al.’s (2012) studies 1 and 2 found that after controlling for 
depressive symptoms, a greater proportion of specific and lower proportion of 
categoric AMs were retrieved in response to low- compared to high self-
discrepant cues. These within-person associations were medium (Cohen, 
1992). At the between-person level, Smets et al. (2013) found depressive 
symptomology to be negatively associated with number of specific AMs and 
positively associated with number of categoric AMs, following but not before a 
self-discrepancy induction.  
Also using a non-clinical sample, Schoofs et al.’s (2013) study 1 found 
no difference in the proportion of either specific or categoric AMs retrieved 
between undergraduates who received a self-discrepancy induction and those 
who did not. However, a theoretical weakness of the authors’ studies is that 
participant omissions were ignored in AM specificity calculations. This 
approach has been advised against because omissions have been found to 
represent non-specific content rather than true absences of AM (Crane et al., 
2007; Raes et al., 2012).  
Therefore, on balance, these findings illustrate that when self-
discrepancies are nomothetically conceptualised a positive association with 
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OGM can be detected amongst non-clinical samples using the MI-AMT. Smets 
et al. reported a low effect size suggesting that this association was stronger 
at the within- than between-person level (Cohen, 1992). 
Discrepancy of Idiographic Goals 
It has been argued that because perceived self-discrepancy is 
subjective and because the SMS contains idiographic representations of goals 
and self-guides, idiographic methodologies are more valid than nomothetic 
methodologies (Conway, 2005; Rogers, 1961). Therefore, findings from the 
following four studies hold more theoretical weight than those studies which 
conceptualised self-discrepancies nomothetically. 
Crane et al. (2007) defined self-discrepancy as AMT cues that were 
self-relevant i.e., cues matching participant-generated A-I, A-O and A-F self-
guides. At the between-person level, it was found that amongst PDs, 
compared to NDs, number of self-relevant cues was negatively correlated with 
number of specific AMs retrieved. Also at the between-person level, van den 
Broeck et al. (2012) found that amongst CDs, but not non-depressed 
individuals, with BPD, proportion of specific AMs retrieved using the AMT was 
negatively associated with cue self-discrepancy. Both findings were large 
effect sizes (Cohen, 1992). These findings provide strong support for a 
positive association between idiographic self-discrepancies and OGM 
amongst clinical samples. 
Wessel et al. (2014) found that both PDs and NDs retrieved a greater 
number of specific AMs in response to affective AMT cues compared to self-
discrepant cues. This association was medium (Cohen, 1992), thus extending 
moderate support for a positive association between idiographic self-
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discrepancies and OGM amongst non-clinical samples at the between-person 
level. Ono and Devilly (2014) found support for an association amongst non-
clinical samples at the within-person level. They found participant distress 
relating to A-F self-guide discrepancies to be associated with a higher number 
of general AMs retrieved, in response to the AMT. The association was large 
(Cohen, 1992). However, this finding may have been conflated by the authors’ 
inclusion of extended as well as general event level AMs in their categorisation 
of “general AM”. Extended AMs are not theoretically implicated with the S-
CMH (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000).  
Collectively these findings offer strong support for a positive association 
between ideographically conceptualised self-discrepancies and OGM at the 
between-person level amongst clinical samples. Support amongst non-clinical 
samples at the between- and within-person level is weaker. 
Goals are more directly implicated within the S-CMH than self-guides or 
dysfunctional attitudes because they are considered the main organising 
principle of the SMS. In support of this Moberly and MacLeod’s (2006) study 1 
found that specific AMs related to currently pursued goals were retrieved 
faster by undergraduates than specific AMs unrelated to current goals. 
Conway (2005) proposes that AMs which challenge the SMS goal-structure 
represent direct threats to self-coherence, which can result in OGM.  
At the within-person level, Moberly and MacLeod’s (2006) studies 1 and 
3 found that AM relating to self-concordant goals was no more accessible than 
AM relating to non-self-concordant goals i.e., goals aligned with the self to a 
greater or lesser degree, respectively (Ryan & Deci, 2002; Sheldon & Elliot, 
1999), at the event specific level. In study 2, at the within-person level, GEK 
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relating to self-concordant goals was found to be retrieved faster than GEK 
relating to non-self-concordant goals. The effect size was large (Cohen, 1992). 
This finding holds more theoretical weight than studies 1 and 3 which did not 
address goal-related AM accessibility at the general event level, which is the 
level at which goal-processing and self-coherence maintenance is implicated 
within the SMS (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Thus, Moberly and 
MacLeod’s (2006) findings bolster the evidence for a positive association 
between discrepancy with respect to idiographic goals and OGM at the within-
person level amongst non-clinical samples.  
Summary  
Ten of the 14 studies from the 10 articles reviewed reported positive 
associations between self-discrepancies and OGM amongst CDs, PDs and 
non-clinical samples at the within- and between-person level. Overall, these 
associations were greater amongst clinical compared to non-clinical 
populations and for studies that conceptualised discrepancy with respect to 
idiographic goals compared to nomothetic goals. Additionally, these 
associations were stronger at the between-person level within clinical 
populations and at the within-person level amongst non-clinical populations. 
These findings concord with Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) S-CMH 
which suggests that specific AMs representing threats to self- (including goal-) 
stability, are less likely to be retrieved than non-threatening information. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) do not state that the S-CMH operates 
differently amongst CDs or PDs compared to NDs. Concordant with this, a 
positive association between self-discrepancies and OGM was found amongst 
clinical as well as non-clinical populations. 
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Limitations  
Systematic between-study comparisons were difficult due to 
methodological variations including OGM and self-discrepancy 
conceptualisation, operationalisation and measurement. A limitation of the 
AMT is that specific AM “retrieval” may measure semantic knowledge that an 
event was experienced rather than the subjective experience of reliving, which 
has been implicated as a relevant feature of AM as it relates to self-coherence 
maintenance (Griffith et al., 2012; Sutin & Robins, 2008). Studies utilising the 
AMT/MI-AMT differed in their procedures. Differences in the method of 
presenting cues and recording responses can influence test results (van 
Vreeswijk & de Wilde, 2004). The majority of participants across all papers 
were female, making generalisations to males difficult. The majority of studies 
reviewed were correlational which means that causation cannot be inferred.   
Implications  
Findings support the assertions that (a) the S-CMH operates in the 
same way amongst clinical and non-clinical populations; (b) the association 
between self-discrepancies and OGM is stronger amongst clinical compared 
to non-clinical populations. This might suggest the operation of an underlying 
mechanism amongst CDs or PDs, but not in NDs, that results in larger self-
discrepancies. This is concordant with Williams et al. (2007) who theorise that 
OGM is maintained by rumination, a form of goal-discrepant self-focus, which 
is commonly experienced by CDs and PDs. Control theories propose that 
rumination is triggered by perceptions of insufficient goal-progress (Carver & 
Scheier, 1998; Martin & Tesser, 2006). Thus, rumination both indicates 
unattained goals and maintains this self-discrepancy focus. Clinically, this 
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suggests that CD or PD clients may find it harder than NDs to generate 
specific AMs. The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (2009) 
recommends cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT) for treating severe depression 
amongst adults. A key component of CBT involves recalling AMs that 
challenge negative core beliefs which are often related to perceived goal 
failures (Beck, 2011; Crane et al., 2008). The findings of this review suggest 
that CD or PD clients, who perceive larger self-discrepancies, may struggle to 
recall specific AMs that challenge (i.e., are discrepant with) their negative core 
beliefs. Future research is required to first test the theoretical idea that OGM 
represents an extreme form of normal AM functioning rather than being 
qualitatively different between clinical and non-clinical populations. 
Conclusion 
This systematic review aimed to explore the association between self-
discrepancies and OGM. Despite some difficulty making between-study 
comparisons due to methodological variation, findings support a positive 
association between self-discrepancies and OGM amongst CDs, PDs and 
non-clinical sample at the within- and between-person level. This is 
concordant with Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) S-CMH of OGM which 
is model of normative AM retrieval. The positive association between self-
discrepancies and OGM was stronger amongst clinical samples at the 
between-person level. Thus, findings suggest that OGM may represent an 
extreme form of normal AM functioning amongst PDs and CDs. Further 
research testing this theoretical assumption is required before clinical 
interventions can be informed. 
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Statement (Moher et al., 2009) 
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numbe
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abstract 
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Introduction   
Background/ra
tionale 
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investigation being reported. 
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Methods   
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paper. 
 4b Important changes to methods after commencement 
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and data collection. 
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and when they were actually administered. 
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bias. 
Quantitative 
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were chosen, and why. 
Statistical 
methods 
12a Describe all statistical methods, including those used 
to control for confounding. 
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12c Explain how missing data were addressed. 
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Main results 16a Give unadjusted estimates and, if applicable, 
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Other 
analyses 
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subgroups and interactions. 
Harms 18 All important harms or unintended effects in each 
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Discussion   
Design 19 Summarise key results with reference to study 
objectives. 
Limitations 20 Discuss limitations of the study, taking into account 
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relevant, multiplicity of analyses. Discuss both 
direction and magnitude of any potential bias. 
Interpretation 21 Give a cautious overall interpretation of results 
considering objectives, limitations, multiplicity of 
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Other 
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applicable, for the original study on which the present 
article is based. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  51 
Appendix B. Submission Guidance for Authors from Memory 
Manuscript preparation 
1. Journal-specific guidelines 
 The journal welcomes both single and multi-experiment articles that 
advance memory theory. The journal also publishes integrative reviews, 
commentaries, and short reports. 
 The style and format of the typescripts should conform to the 
specifications given in the Publication Manual of the American 
Psychological Association (6th ed.). 
 There is no word limit for manuscripts submitted to this journal, except 
short reports. Short reports are limited to 2,500 to 4,000 words in length 
(including the abstract, main text, and footnotes). 
2. General guidelines 
 Manuscripts are accepted in English. British English spelling and 
punctuation are preferred. Please use double quotation marks, except 
where “a quotation is ‘within’ a quotation”. Long quotations of words or 
more should be indented without quotation marks. 
 Manuscripts should be compiled in the following order: title page; 
abstract; keywords; main text; acknowledgements; references; 
appendices (as appropriate); table(s) with caption(s) (on individual 
pages); figure caption(s) (as a list). 
 Abstracts of 150-200 words are required for all manuscripts submitted. 
 Each manuscript should have up to 5 keywords. 
 Search engine optimization (SEO) is a means of making your article 
more visible to anyone who might be looking for it. Please consult our 
guidance here. 
 Section headings should be concise. 
 All authors of a manuscript should include their full names, affiliations, 
postal addresses, telephone numbers and email addresses on the 
cover page of the manuscript. One author should be identified as the 
corresponding author. Please give the affiliation where the research 
was conducted. If any of the named co-authors moves affiliation during 
the peer review process, the new affiliation can be given as a footnote. 
Please note that no changes to affiliation can be made after the 
manuscript is accepted. Please note that the email address of the 
corresponding author will normally be displayed in the article PDF 
(depending on the journal style) and the online article. 
 All persons who have a reasonable claim to authorship must be named 
in the manuscript as co-authors; the corresponding author must be 
authorized by all co-authors to act as an agent on their behalf in all 
matters pertaining to publication of the manuscript, and the order of 
names should be agreed by all authors. 
 Biographical notes on contributors are not required for this journal. 
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 Please supply all details required by any funding and grant-awarding 
bodies as an Acknowledgement on the title page of the manuscript, in a 
separate paragraph, as follows:  
o For single agency grants: "This work was supported by the 
[Funding Agency] under Grant [number xxxx]." 
o For multiple agency grants: "This work was supported by the 
[Funding Agency 1] under Grant [number xxxx]; [Funding Agency 
2] under Grant [number xxxx]; and [Funding Agency 3] under 
Grant [number xxxx]." 
 Authors must also incorporate a Disclosure Statement which will 
acknowledge any financial interest or benefit they have arising from the 
direct applications of their research. 
 For all manuscripts non-discriminatory language is mandatory. Sexist or 
racist terms must not be used. 
 Authors must adhere to SI units. Units are not italicised. 
 When using a word which is or is asserted to be a proprietary term or 
trade mark, authors must use the symbol ® or TM. 
2. Style guidelines 
 Description of the Journal’s reference style.  
 Guide to using mathematical scripts and equations.  
 Word templates are available for this journal. If you are not able to use 
the template via the links or if you have any other template queries, 
please contact authortemplate@tandf.co.uk. 
 Authors must not embed equations or image files within their 
manuscript 
3. Figures 
 Please provide the highest quality figure format possible. Please be 
sure that all imported scanned material is scanned at the appropriate 
resolution: 1200 dpi for line art, 600 dpi for grayscale and 300 dpi for 
colour. 
 Figures must be saved separate to text. Please do not embed figures in 
the manuscript file. 
 Files should be saved as one of the following formats: TIFF (tagged 
image file format), PostScript or EPS (encapsulated PostScript), and 
should contain all the necessary font information and the source file of 
the application (e.g., CorelDraw/Mac, CorelDraw/PC). 
 All figures must be numbered in the order in which they appear in the 
manuscript (e.g., Figure 1, Figure 2). In multi-part figures, each part 
should be labelled (e.g., Figure 1(a), Figure 1(b)). 
 Figure captions must be saved separately, as part of the file containing 
the complete text of the manuscript, and numbered correspondingly. 
 The filename for a graphic should be descriptive of the graphic, e.g., 
Figure1, Figure2a. 
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Submission fee  
There is no submission fee for Memory. 
Page charges  
There are no page charges for Memory. 
Colour charges  
Colour figures will be reproduced in colour in the online edition of the journal 
free of charge. If it is necessary for the figures to be reproduced in colour in 
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£250 per figure ($395 US Dollars; $385 Australian Dollars; 315 Euros). For 
more than 4 colour figures, figures 5 and above will be charged at £50 per 
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5. Reproduction of copyright material 
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copyright, you must obtain written permission from the copyright owner, prior 
to submission. Such material may be in the form of text, data, table, 
illustration, photograph, line drawing, audio clip, video clip, film still, and 
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applies to direct (verbatim or facsimile) reproduction as well as “derivative 
reproduction” (where you have created a new figure or table which derives 
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for reuse. 
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the purposes of criticism may be possible without formal permission on the 
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additional information for online publication. 
 Information about supplemental online material  
Manuscript submission 
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Abstract 
Objective: This study aimed to test predictions made by the self-memory 
system (SMS) model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), extensions of 
Williams et al.’s (2007) “capture and rumination” (CaR) mechanism (Debeer, 
Hermans, & Raes, 2009) and control theories of rumination (Martin & Tesser, 
1996, 2006) in a non-clinical sample to further understand the processes 
underlying overgeneral memory (OGM). It was hypothesised that (i) ruminating 
on unresolved goals, compared to thinking about resolved goals, would 
increase OGM, in participants reporting high levels of trait brooding and (ii) 
that this effect would be greater following goal-cues that are derived from goal 
cues rated as (a) more important compared to those rated as less important; 
(b) more progress-discrepant compared to those rated as less progress-
discrepant; (c) more relevant to unresolved goals compared to those that are 
rated as less relevant to unresolved goals. 
Method: A between-subjects factor of condition (resolved versus unresolved 
goal-focus induction) and a within-subjects factor of time (pre- and post-
manipulation Minimal Instruction Autobiographical Memory Test [MI-AMT; 
Debeer et al., 2009]) design was utilised with 75 undergraduate and three 
masters psychology students (86.3 % female [n = 65]; age, M = 20.2 years, 
range = 18-43, SD = 4.9) from the University of Exeter. The MI-AMT was used 
to measure autobiographical memory (AM) specificity before and following a 
manipulation whereby participants were randomly assigned to either a control 
condition in which participants focussed on a resolved goal or an experimental 
condition which was designed to induce rumination about an unresolved (i.e., 
self-discrepant) goal. MI-AMT cues were adjectives relating to nomothetic 
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goal-statements. 
Results: Hierarchical multiple regression analyses found neither an 
overall effect of condition nor an interaction between condition and brooding 
on AM specificity. Thus, induced rumination over unresolved goals did not lead 
to higher levels of OGM than induced focus on resolved goals amongst 
individuals high in trait brooding. Multilevel hierarchical regression found that 
the extent to which people high on brooding were less specific in the 
unresolved condition did not depend on the importance or progress-
discrepancy ratings of the goal-statements from which the MI-AMT cues were 
developed, nor on the relevance of the goal-cues to the concern identified in 
the goal cueing task. Goal-cue relevance ratings showed a significant main 
effect on AM specificity qualified by an interaction with condition whereby 
participants reported decreasingly specific AMs in response to cues related to 
the concern after the resolved goal manipulation. 
Conclusion: These null findings suggest that rumination over unresolved goals 
may not increase OGM amongst non-clinical samples. A replication of this 
study should utilise state rumination checks to ensure that the goal cueing task 
successfully differentially induced state rumination between conditions. Further 
exploration of the role of reflection might elucidate which qualities of 
rumination are positively associated with OGM but not present in rumination 
about unresolved goals. Given that Williams et al.’s CaR mechanism was 
constructed to understand OGM in clinical depression, a replication of this 
study using a clinical sample may be a useful next step in testing predictions 
made by this theory. 
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Introduction 
When asked to recall specific autobiographical memories (AMs), 
previously depressed individuals (PDs) and currently depressed individuals 
(CDs) are likely to generate overgeneral memories (OGM), which are generic 
summaries of general events (Williams et al., 2007). OGM has been found to 
predict depressive symptomology (Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Mackinger, 
Pachinger, Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000). A greater understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying OGM may contribute towards more clinically effective 
assessment, prevention and treatment of depression (Moore & Zoellner, 
2007). Theories have suggested that OGM may result (a) from attempts to 
prevent threats to self-coherence posed by recalling specific AM (Conway, 
2005); (b) when CDs or PDs engage in brooding: abstract negative repetitive 
thought focused on self-discrepancies (Debeer et al., 2009). Goal-progress 
discrepancies are theorised to result in rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996, 
2006). This study investigated whether induced rumination about unresolved 
goals would lead to OGM in individuals high in trait brooding.   
AM has been defined as the recall of self-related past events that 
contribute to an individual’s sense of self and goal pursuit (Brewer, 1986; 
Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Goals can be defined as mental representations of 
desired future self-states that motivate individuals to reduce perceived 
discrepancies between these and the current self-state (Austin & Vancouver, 
1996; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1986; Kanfer, 1970, 1977). By reminding individuals 
about goal attainments and failures, specific AMs motivate self-regulation 
(Karniol & Ross, 1996; Pillemer, 2003; Tulving, 1983). It has been suggested 
that perceived discrepancies between the past-self and present-self may lead 
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to altered AM recall in order to promote self-coherence (Conway, 2005; Swann 
& Bosson, 2010; Wilson & Ross, 2003). Conway, Meares and Standart 
(2004a) propose that by retaining information in an abstract, rather than 
detailed format, AM can provide a (a) sufficiently accurate record of goal 
processing to inform self-regulation; (b) temporally coherent sense of self. 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) self-memory system (SMS) model 
proposes that AMs contain abstract knowledge derived from goals which 
informs goal-progress, and thus, self-coherence. Reconstruction of AMs 
involves retrieval across three hierarchically organised levels of specificity 
(Figure 1). At the most general level, individuals’ lifetime periods reflect the 
pursuit of particular overarching goals, e.g., “When I lived with John”. More 
specific are general events, defined as categories of events linked across time 
periods, e.g., “Holidays in Spain”. Event specific knowledge (ESK) represents 
specific knowledge of particular events and includes sensory-perceptual 
details (Conway, 2001), e.g., “Seeing that red dress when I went to Sarah’s 
party last Saturday”. OGM results when the retrieval process stops at a more 
general level instead of progressing to ESK.  
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Figure 1. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model of autobiographical 
memory. 
AM retrieval results from interaction between three SMS structures: the 
long-term self, the episodic memory system and the working self (Figure 2). 
The long-term self encompasses the autobiographical knowledge base, 
containing lifetime periods and general events, and the conceptual self, which 
includes goals and self-guides (Conway et al., 2004a; Conway, 2005). Specific 
AM formation requires coordinated retrieval between the long-term self and 
episodic memory system, which contains sensory-perceptual information. This 
process is overseen by the working self, which monitors goal progress and 
maintains self-coherence by regulating the construction, retention and 
accessibility of AM (Conway, 2005). If recalling a specific AM is likely to cause 
self-discrepancy, such as awareness of distance between perceived current 
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circumstances and desired goals (Crane, Barnhofer, Visser, Nightingale, & 
Williams, 2007a), the working self re-directs information processing within the 
long-term self in order to maintain self-coherence (Conway, 2005). This aborts 
the hierarchical search process for a specific AM at a more general level, 
which can result in OGM (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The self-memory system (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007b). 
In support of Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) theory of OGM is 
evidence demonstrating a positive association between self-discrepancies and 
OGM amongst CDs and PDs (Raes, Schoofs, Griffith, & Herman, 2012; van 
den Broeck, Claes, Pieters, & Raes, 2012) and non-depressed individuals 
(Ono & Devilly, 2013). Studies measuring idiographic goal-discrepancies have 
reported larger effect sizes than nomothetic goal-discrepancies (Crane et al., 
2007b; Wessel et al., 2014), suggesting that self-discrepant information which 
maps onto the conceptual self is likely to threaten self-coherence, and thus 
result in OGM. 
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Compatible with the SMS model, Williams (2006) suggests that “capture 
and rumination” (CaR) may be one mechanism underlying OGM. Rumination, 
a response to sad mood associated with depression (Nolen- Hoeksema, 
2004), is suggested to involve the activation of abstract, evaluative negative 
self-concepts and perceived self-discrepancies (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco,& 
Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008; Valentino, 2011). Antithetical to active 
problem-solving, depressive rumination is thought to prolong distress (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). According to CaR models, conceptual self-
representations are highly elaborated and therefore easily activated amongst 
PDs or CDs, via state (depressive) rumination (Raes et al., 2012). 
Consequently, CDs or PDs are more likely to remain, or become “captured”, at 
a more conceptual, general level of retrieval instead of moving down the SMS 
hierarchy to access ESK (Sumner, 2012). Supporting CaR, there is research 
suggesting that OGM and depressive rumination are positively associated and 
mutually reinforce one another (Raes et al., 2005; 2006a; Raes, Hermans, 
Williams, Geypen, & Eelen, 2006b). Additionally, both appear to be 
vulnerability markers for depression, rather than being mood-dependent, in 
that they can be detected in PDs who are no longer depressed (Raes et al., 
2006b; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002). 
Treynor, Gonzalez, and Nolen-Hoeksema (2003) found support for a 
two-factor model of rumination comprising the components reflection and 
brooding. The authors define brooding as “...passive comparison of one’s 
current situation with some unachieved standard” that is more evaluative and 
conceptual in nature than reflection, which is defined as “...turning inward to 
engage in cognitive problem solving...”.  Brooders are thought to be more 
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susceptible to capture because such abstract thinking strengthens 
connections between conceptual self-relevant information (Sumner et al., 
2014). Support for this assertion comes from findings that inducing analytic 
rumination maintains OGM, whilst non-ruminative experiential processing 
reduces it, amongst CDs (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004) and non-
depressed individuals (Raes, Watkins, Williams, & Hermans, 2008). That 
analytic and experiential manipulations have similar effects on levels of self-
focus suggests that OGM cannot be explained by level of self-focus alone, but 
rather by the form of self-processing (Watkins & Moulds, 2005; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2004). Empirical findings suggest that brooding is a maladaptive 
component of rumination that predicts depression (Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Lo, 
Ho, & Hollon, 2008; O’Connor & Noyce, 2008). Only two studies have 
investigated the relationship between brooding and OGM following self-
discrepant AM cues (Schoofs, Hermans, Griffith, &, Raes, 2013; Wessel et al., 
2014). Neither reported significant associations amongst CDs, PDs or non-
depressed individuals. The authors attributed these null findings to not having 
activated large enough self-discrepancies. 
The response style theory conceptualisation of rumination differs from 
that offered by self-regulation theories (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 2006; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987), which suggest that, initiated by perceived 
goal-discrepancies, rumination is a form of repetitive thought whose function is 
to continuously re-direct individuals’ attention back to goal-progress in order to 
resolve the discrepancy (Martin, Shrira, & Startup, 2004). Control theories 
focus on the rate at which self-discrepancies, perceived in terms of rates of 
goal progress, are reduced (Carver & Scheier, 1998). For example, Martin and 
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Tesser’s (1996, 2006) goal-progress model proposes that goal progress and 
goal importance jointly predict rumination. They assert that perceived 
discrepant-from-desired goal progress triggers ruminative thoughts, which 
endures until satisfactory goal progress is resumed or the goal disengaged 
from. The model proposes that ruminative intensity is proportional to 
subjective goal importance and that rumination is likely to be cued by goal-
related references in the environment. Studies have demonstrated positive 
associations between perceived lack of goal progress and rumination 
(Lavallee & Campbell, 1995; Moberly & Watkins, 2010; Roberts, Watkins, & 
Wills, 2013) and that constructs related to unattained goals are more 
accessible than those related to attained goals (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; 
Förster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005). As yet, no studies have investigated the 
relationship between OGM and rumination, or brooding, in conjunction with 
goal progress-discrepancy. Rumination, as suggested by Martin and Tesser 
(2006) and Watkins (2008), is not necessarily adaptive or maladaptive. 
Brooding, however, is considered to be a maladaptive form of abstract self-
discrepant focus (Treynor et al., 2003). Thus, when confronted with a goal-
discrepancy, a person high in brooding might display increased OGM. 
AM has been considered to be central to self-coherence and self-
regulation (Nelson & Fivush, 2004; Williams, 2006). According to the SMS 
model, the retrieval of specific information is prevented if doing so is likely to 
cause self-discrepancy. Rather than changes in level of self-focus, brooding is 
also theorised to capture attentional processing at a more abstract level of AM 
retrieval, thereby preventing specific AM retrieval (Williams et al., 2007; 
Debeer et al., 2009). Because cueing an important and relevant unresolved 
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goal would risk the detection of self-discrepant to-be-recalled information, the 
re-direction of attentional processing to a more general event level within the 
SMS model would prevent specific AM construction and instead result in 
OGM. This would be most likely to occur amongst high brooders, whose 
abstract self-discrepant focus is theorised to capture attention at this more 
abstract level of AM retrieval. Although there is evidence supporting an 
association between self-discrepancies and OGM, no studies have yet tested 
the notion that ruminating about unresolved goals results in higher levels of 
OGM for higher trait brooders. Furthermore, this study aimed to test the 
prediction derived from the SMS model, that OGM would be particularly likely 
in relation to AMs relating to goals that were higher in importance, self-
discrepancy and relevant to the ruminative concern. Hypotheses were: 
1. Ruminating on unresolved goals, compared to thinking about 
resolved goals, will increase OGM, but only in participants reporting 
high levels of trait brooding. 
2. This effect will be greater following goal-cues that are (a) derived 
from goals rated as more important compared to those rated as less 
important; (b) derived from goals rated as more progress-discrepant 
than those rated as less progress-discrepant; (c) more relevant to the 
ruminative concern compared to those that are rated as less relevant 
to the ruminative concern. 
Method 
Participants  
Seventy-five undergraduate and three masters psychology students 
were recruited (86.3% female [n = 65]; age, M = 20.2 years, range = 18-43, 
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SD = 4.9). Inclusion criteria were (a) having English as a native language; (b) 
age between 18 and 60 years. An opportunity sample of students was 
recruited from the University of Exeter and remunerated with course credits 
and/or money. One hundred and ten participants were initially recruited; two 
dropped out during phase one, eight were excluded following phase one 
because English was not indicated as their native language and 22 chose not 
to complete phase two. Forty participants were randomised to the 
experimental condition and 38 to the control condition. Due to a lack of 
research utilising similar designs to the current study,  
Due to a lack of previous research using comparable designs on which 
to base estimates of effect sizes, the study was powered to detect a medium 
effect size according to Cohen (1992). Therefore, for hypothesis 1, the effect 
size for the test of the increase in ∆R² associated with the entry of the 
condition x trait brooding interaction in multiple regression was, ƒ2 = .15. 
Hypothesis 2 was a test of the condition x trait brooding x goal variable 
interaction in a binary multilevel regression. Power calculations for binary 
multilevel models are complex but, Moineddin, Matheson and Glazier (2007) 
suggest that a minimum sample size of 100 for level 1 and a minimum sample 
size of 50 for level 2 for multilevel regression reduces the risk that the 
standard errors of the variance component estimates are underestimated. For 
hypothesis 2 these criteria were met because the level 1 (goal-level) sample 
size was 1248 and the level 2 (person-level) sample size was 78. Hypothesis 
2 was at the goal-level and therefore, although goals were clustered within 
participants, power was expected to be higher for the test of hypothesis 2 than 
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the test of hypothesis 1 because there were a larger number of goals than 
participants.  
Design 
The experiment had a between-subjects factor of condition (resolved 
versus unresolved goal-focus induction) and a within-subjects factor of time 
(pre- and post-Minimal Instruction Autobiographical Memory Test [MI-AMT; 
Debeer et al., 2009]). Outcome variables were OGM, mood (happiness and 
sadness ratings) and level of self-focus. Predictor variables were (at the 
between-person level) trait brooding and (at the within-person level) ratings of 
(a) goal-statement importance; (b) goal progress-discrepancy; (c) relevance of 
goal-cues to concerns identified in the experimental manipulation. 
Measures 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The 
BDI-II measures severity of depressive symptoms experienced during the 
preceding two weeks. It is a well-established, well-validated and reliable 21-
item self-rated questionnaire (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998; Sprinkle et 
al., 2002). Item responses range from 0 to 3. Responses are summed to 
generate an overall score (range = 0–63); higher scores indicating more 
severe depressive symptoms. Cronbach’s alpha was .93 in this study. 
Ruminative Responses Scale-Brooding (RRS-B; Treynor et al., 2003).   
Trait brooding was measured using five items from Response Styles 
Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Responses range 
from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) for whether participants “generally” 
focus attention on negative or self-blaming thoughts, such as “Why do I always 
react this way?” when feeling sad or depressed (Appendix A1). This sub-
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component of the measure has been found to be particularly strongly 
predictive of future depressive symptoms (Treynor et al., 2003). The authors 
reported the alpha for this subscale as .77 and the two-year test re-test 
correlation as .62. The RSQ has acceptable construct validity, high internal 
consistency and good test-retest reliability (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991). The five items of the RRS identified by Treynor et al. (2003) were 
summed to form an index of brooding. Cronbach’s alpha was .85 in this study. 
Generation of memory cues. Eight goals that spanned a range of 
content domains were selected from Chulef, Read and Walsh’s (2001) 
taxonomy of personal goals. Goal statements were generated from these by 
the experimenter (Appendix A2): 
1. have an intimate romantic relationship. 
2. have good relations with my family. 
3. look physically attractive. 
4. maintain good friendships. 
5. be in touch with my spirituality. 
6. live according to moral principles. 
7. appreciate the creative arts. 
8. get a good education. 
Following this, one pair of corresponding goal-cues was generated, to be 
used as MI-AMT cues, for each goal-statement. Each set of eight goal-cues 
was randomised and counterbalanced across the MI-AMT pre- and post-
manipulation.  
Minimal Instruction Autobiographical Memory Test (MI-AMT; Debeer 
et al., 2009). Whilst the majority of research has investigated OGM using the 
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Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986), the MI-
AMT was utilised because it has been found to be a more sensitive and valid 
instrument in high-functioning non-clinical samples (Debeer et al., 2009; 
Griffith et al., 2009). In both versions, participants are asked to generate an 
AM within 60 seconds in response to single cue words (Appendix A3). Unlike 
the AMT, the MI-AMT does not explicitly instruct participants that AMs should 
be specific. No examples of correct responses are given, nor practice items 
provided. Responses are written by participants in A4 booklets: one page per 
cue word and AM. Participants were asked to score their AMs after each MI-
AMT administration in accordance with Debeer et al.’s (2009) scoring 
procedure: specific (lasting less than a day), categoric (summarised events), 
extended (lasting longer than one day), semantic associates (verbal 
responses containing no AM), or omission (no response). Responses were 
later scored by the experimenter, blind to condition. An independent judge 
scored one third of the total AMs. Inter-rater reliability indicated good 
agreement (kappa = .82). Where experimenter and judge disagreed, 
participants’ own scoring was used.  
Goal cueing task. A goal-cueing task previously used by Roberts et al. 
(2013) was administered as an effective means of establishing the concerns 
that trigger rumination within a student population. In the experimental 
condition, participants were asked to identify an ongoing, unresolved concern 
that had repeatedly come to mind and caused feelings of sadness or stress 
during the preceding week. In the control condition, participants were asked to 
identify a concern that had previously caused distress, but had since been 
resolved. In both conditions, “concerns” are thought to represent goals. 
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Examples of appropriate concerns are provided. Participants are asked to 
briefly outline the identified concern so that the experimenter can verify their 
understanding. On six 9-point Likert-type scales, participants rated the 
identified problem in terms of (a) the extent to which it was personally 
important; (b) the extent to which it was currently bothersome; (c) the extent to 
which it had been bothersome at the time it was worst; (d) how much it had 
been thought about during the previous week; (e) how long it had been a 
difficulty; (f) how much it related to more general personal concerns. Over 
headphones, participants then listened to a pre-recorded, guided, 10 minute 
script designed to induce state focus on either the unresolved (experimental 
condition) or resolved (control condition) concern. An example script item from 
the unresolved condition: “Focus on what about this problem/difficulty 
bothers/troubles you”. An example from the resolved condition: “Think about 
how the problem/difficulty is now resolved” (full text in Appendix A4). The 
unresolved and resolved conditions were designed to directly contrast the 
impact of self-focus on resolved and unresolved goals, thereby manipulating 
self-discrepancy and rumination. Focus on unresolved goals has been found 
to increase rumination relative to focus on unresolved goals (Roberts et al., 
2013). 
Goal-statement importance ratings. A 7-point Likert-type item was 
used to rate the importance of each of the eight goal-statements: “Please rate 
the following goals in terms of how important they are to you”. Scores ranged 
from 1 (extremely unimportant) to 7 (extremely important). 
Progress towards goal-statement ratings. A 7-point Likert-type item 
was used to rate perceived progress towards each of the eight goal-
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statements: “How much progress do you think you are making towards this 
goal?” Scores ranged from 1 (none at all) to 7 (very great). 
MI-AMT (Debeer et al., 2009) goal-cue relevance ratings. A 7-point 
Likert-type item was used to rate the relevance of each of the 16 MI-AMT goal-
cues to the personal concern identified in the goal cueing task (Appendix A5). 
Scores ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 7 (highly relevant). Across the 16 goal-
cues, average relevance ratings for each of the eight cue pairs corresponding 
with the eight goal-statements were collapsed to create eight mean goal-cue 
relevance scores per participant. As intended, no statistically significant 
difference was found between participants’ goal-cue relevance ratings 
between two cue sets, t = 1.05. 
Mood ratings. Three 7-point Likert-type scale ratings were collected on 
five occasions to measure participant state (a) happiness; (b) sadness; (c) 
self-focus (Appendix A6). Responses ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
Procedure 
The study was implemented in two phases (Figure 3). Phase one was 
administered online at www.psychsurveys.org and lasted approximately 30 
minutes: participants completed the BDI-II, RRS-B and completed the ratings 
for goal-statement importance and progress. Phase two occurred 
approximately one week later on campus using E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, 2012). Participation took approximately one hour. First, 
participants completed mood (happiness and sadness) and self-focus ratings. 
The first MI-AMT was then administered, followed by ratings of mood and self-
focus. Following this participants were randomly allocated to either the 
unresolved or resolved condition of the goal cueing task, which they 
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completed. Participants then completed mood and self-focus ratings, followed 
by the second MI-AMT. After this participants completed mood and self-focus 
ratings, followed by the MI-AMT goal-cue relevance to concern ratings. Finally, 
participants completed a five minute mood neutralisation exercise (Appendix 
A7) and mood and self-focus ratings for the final time.  
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Figure 3. A flowchart illustrating the procedure. 
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Data Screening 
All screening and statistical procedures were performed on the data for 
the 78 participants who completed phases one and two. For the continuous 
data, outliers were detected by inspecting z-scores, descriptive data, and 
distributions using stem and leaf plots, and histograms. No outliers were 
detected for RRS-B (brooding) scores. In order to more easily interpret effects 
RRS-B scores were mean centred. BDI-II scores were log10 transformed to 
correct for skewed distribution, which also removed all outliers. After 
screening, data for all 78 participants were retained for analysis (Appendix 
B1). 
Analytic Strategy 
Equivalence between conditions was checked using t-tests and chi-
squared tests. Moderated multiple regression and tests of simple slopes were 
utilised to test the first hypothesis. For the second hypothesis multilevel 
regression was used because it allowed an examination of associations 
between goal characteristics and AM specificity at the within-person level 
whilst taking into account the non-independence of each participant’s AMs 
(Khan & Shaw, 2011). Where data are nested, multilevel modelling (MLM) 
provides better parameter estimates than ordinary least squares (OLS) 
methods (Nezlek, 2007). To provide ‘pure’ estimates of within-person 
associations that were uncontaminated by between-person differences, all 
goal-level variables were centred around the person-means (Enders & Tofighi, 
2007) and all individual difference variables were grand-mean-centred. In a 
hierarchical multilevel regression model predicting AM specificity post-
manipulation, AM specificity pre-manipulation was entered in step one. 
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Depressive symptoms and brooding were entered in step two. Condition 
(unresolved versus resolved) was entered in the third step. To test hypothesis 
1, an interaction between brooding and condition was entered at the fourth 
step. Within the MLM, ratings of (a) goal importance; (b) goal progress-
discrepancy; (c) goal-cue relevance to concern were entered in three different 
models to examine whether each of these variables would explain significant 
additional variance at the within-person level. In each model two-way 
interactions involving each of the three goal-level variables with condition and 
brooding, as well as two-way interactions between condition and brooding 
were then included. In the final step, each model included a three-way 
interaction between condition, brooding and the particular goal-level variable, 
thereby testing hypothesis 2. All statistical tests are two-tailed and the .05 level 
is used for statistical significance. 
Operationalisation of AM Specificity 
For the OLS regression, AM specificity was operationalised both as 
number of specific AMs retrieved and (inversely) number of categoric AMs 
retrieved because (a) this is in line with previous research (e.g., Raes et al., 
2012; Smets, Griffith, Wessel, Walschaerst, & Raes, 2013); (b) research has 
shown that OGM in depression does not depend on extended AMs (Williams & 
Dritschel, 1992). For the logistic MLM AM specificity was operationalised as 
number of specific AMs using a binary scoring system (coded “0” for non-
specific and “1” for specific).  
Results 
Independent samples t-tests and chi squared tests revealed no 
significant demographic or baseline variable differences between the 
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unresolved or resolved conditions (Table 1). Participant goal cueing task 
concern ratings, and mood and self-focus ratings are reported in Appendices 
B2 and B3, respectively. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Characteristics for Participants  
 Unresolved 
(n = 40) 
Resolved  
(n = 38) 
t or chi 
sq 
p 
Age 20.18 (4.98) 
 
20.11 (4.84) 
 
-.63  
 
.95 
Gender (% female) 75.00 92.10 2.97  
 
.09 
BDI score  10.48 (8.05)  12.45 
(11.83) 
 
.87  
 
.39 
RRS-B 
 
9.75 (3.66) 10.05 (3.58) .37  .71 
Person average goal-
statement importance 
ratings 
 
5.23 (.92) 5.45 (.81) 1.08  .28 
Person average goal 
progress-discrepancy 
ratings 
 
3.52 (.68) 3.55 (.74) .17  .87 
Initial happiness ratings 
 
5.03 (.92) 5.08 (.88) .26  .79 
Initial sadness ratings 
 
2.40 (1.22) 2.45 (1.2) .17  .86 
Initial self-focus ratings 
 
4.65 (1.05) 4.53 (1.11) -.51  .61 
Note.  Standard deviations are presented between parentheses  
Paired sample t-tests revealed no significant differences between the 
number of specific, categoric or “other” (scored as extended, semantic 
associates or omissions) AMs retrieved from pre- to post-manipulation 
amongst participants in either the unresolved or resolved goal condition (Table 
2). Between-subjects correlations among depressive symptoms, brooding and 
AM specificity pre-manipulation (operationalised as number of specific and 
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categoric AMs) revealed that brooding was not significantly correlated with 
number of specific or categoric AMs pre-manipulation (Appendix B4). Gender 
did not correlate with any of these variables and so was not further analysed.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Characteristics for the Number of Specific and Number of Categoric and Number of Other AMs Pre- and Post-
manipulation in Unresolved and Resolved Conditions  
 No. 
spec 
AMs 
pre-man 
 
No. 
spec 
AMs 
post-
man 
 
t p No. cat 
AMs pre-
man 
 
No. cat 
AMs 
post-man 
 
t p No. other 
AMs pre-
man 
No. other 
AMs post-
man 
t p 
Unresolved 
 
3.30  2.85 1.06 .30 2.45 2.90 -1.42 .16 2.25 2.25 .00 1.00 
Resolved 
 
3.26 2.76 1.38 .18 2.47 2.47 .00 1.00 2.26 2.76 -1.76 .09 
Note. No. spec = number of specific; No. cat = number of categoric; AMs = autobiographical memories; man = manipulation. Other = 
all AMs scored as “extended”, “semantic associates” or “omissions”. 
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Hypothesis 1. Did People with High Brooding Scores in the Unresolved 
Goal Condition Recall Fewer Specific AMs After the Manipulation than 
Other Participants? 
  Two hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to 
assess whether the interaction between brooding (RRS-B scores) and 
condition (unresolved versus resolved) predicted AM specificity 
(operationalised as number of specific or number of categoric AMs retrieved) 
post-manipulation, after controlling for AM specificity pre-manipulation and 
depressive symptoms (BDI-II score) (Tables 3 and 4).  
Number of specific AMs. Number of specific AMs retrieved pre-
manipulation was entered at step one, explaining 0.3% of the variance in 
number of specific AMs post-manipulation. This was not statistically 
significant. In step two, depressive symptoms and brooding scores were 
entered, explaining an additional 6% of variance, which was not significant. 
Whilst depressive symptoms was not a statistically significant individual 
predictor, brooding was statistically significant, β = -.27, p < .05. Condition was 
entered in step three, explaining an additional .04% of variance, which was not 
significant. The critical interaction between condition and brooding at step four 
explained an additional .1% of variance, which was not statistically significant, 
failing to support hypothesis 1. 
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Table 3 
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis to Explore the 
Association of Number of Specific AMs Pre-manipulation, Depressive 
Symptoms, Brooding and Condition on Number of Specific AMs Post-
manipulation 
 B SE Β ∆R² 
Step 1    .003 
AM specificity pre-manipulation -.05 .10 -.05  
Step 2    .06 
AM specificity pre-manipulation -.02 .10 -.02  
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) .24 .63 .05  
Brooding (RRS-B) -.12 .06 -.27*  
Step 3    .0004 
AM specificity pre-manipulation -.02 .10 -.03  
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) .25 .64 .05  
Brooding (RRS-B) -.12 .06 -.27  
Condition .07 .37 .02  
Step 4    .001 
AM specificity pre-manipulation -.02 .10 -.02  
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) .27 .64 .06  
Brooding (RRS-B) -.10 .08 -.23  
Condition .07 .37 .02  
Condition x brooding -.04 .10 -.06  
Note. The overall model was not statistically significant. * p < .05.  
Number of categoric AMs. Number of categoric AMs pre-manipulation 
was entered at step one, explaining 2.3% of variance in number of categoric 
AMs post-manipulation, which was not statistically significant. Depressive 
symptoms and brooding scores were entered at step two, explaining an 
additional 3.6% variance. This was not statistically significant. Condition, 
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entered at step three explained a further 1.7% of variance, which was not 
statistically significant. Entry of the critical interaction between condition and 
brooding at step four explained a further 1.6% of variance, which was not 
statistically significant, failing to support hypothesis 1. 
Table 4 
Summary of Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis to Explore the 
Association of Number of Categoric AMs Pre-manipulation, Depressive 
Symptoms, Brooding and Condition on Number of Categoric AMs Post-
manipulation 
 B SE Β ∆R² 
Step 1    .02 
AM specificity pre-manipulation .01 .12 .16  
Step 2    .04 
AM specificity pre-manipulation .15 .12 .15  
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) -.41 .68 -.08  
Brooding (RRS-B) .10 .06 .22  
Step 3    .02 
AM specificity pre-manipulation .15 .12 .15  
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) -.35 .68 -.07  
Brooding (RRS-B) .10 .06 .22  
Condition .44 .39 .13  
Step 4    .02 
AM specificity pre-manipulation .17 .12 .16  
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) -.40 .68 -.08  
Brooding (RRS-B) .04 .08 .09  
Condition .44 .39 .13  
Condition x brooding .12 .11 .18  
Note. The overall model was not statistically significant. 
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Hypothesis 2. Did Participants with High Brooding Scores in the 
Unresolved Goal Condition Recall Fewer Specific AMs Post-manipulation 
Than Other Participants, Following AM Cues That Were Rated by 
Participants as (a) More Important; (b) Having Higher Progress-
discrepancy Rates; (c) More Relevant to Unresolved Goals? 
A hierarchical multilevel regression model was constructed to explore 
which goal qualities predicted unique variance in AM specificity post-
manipulation, at both the between-person and within-person levels of analysis. 
To conduct the between-person analysis, person-level predictors were entered 
first: AM specificity pre-manipulation, depressive symptoms (BDI-II score), 
brooding (RRS-B score) and condition (unresolved versus resolved). This 
replicated the previous between-person OLS analysis. Subsequently, for the 
within-person analysis, AM specificity pre-manipulation was entered as a 
within-person predictor. Each goal-level predictor was then entered in 
separate models: (a) goal-statement importance (herein referred to as “goal 
importance”); (b) goal-statement progress-discrepancy ratings (herein referred 
to as “goal progress-discrepancy”); (c) goal-cue relevance to the concern 
identified by participants in the goal cueing task (herein referred to as “goal-
cue relevance”). Goal-statement progress ratings were reverse-scored to 
produce goal-statement progress-discrepancy ratings: higher scores for goal 
progress-discrepancy indicate lower perceived rates of progress. After each 
goal-level predictor variable was entered, two-way interactions between this 
variable and (a) condition; (b) brooding were added, followed by the critical 
three-way interaction between the goal-level variable, condition and brooding, 
thereby testing hypothesis 2. 
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Tables 5 to 7 present summaries of two-level random intercept models 
exploring the association between AM specificity pre-manipulation, depressive 
symptoms, brooding, condition and each of the goal-level variables (goal 
importance, goal progress-discrepancy, or goal-cue relevance) and AM 
specificity post-manipulation. Each multilevel model specifies a random 
intercept and a fixed slope for each predictor variable. The B0 coefficient is the 
fixed intercept and relates mathematically (log of the odds ratio) to the 
probability, over the whole sample, that a given AM post-manipulation is 
specific when all predictor variables have the value of zero. The u0j value 
represents the amount of between-person variability in AM specificity. 
Goal importance ratings. After person-level predictors (AM specificity 
pre-manipulation, depressive symptoms, brooding and condition) were added 
at step one, none predicted statistically significant amounts of variance in AM 
specificity post-manipulation: AM specificity pre-manipulation, B = -.03, SE(B) 
= .06, z = -.50, p = .62, depressive symptoms, B = -.30, SE(B) = .27, z = -1.10, 
p = .27, brooding, B = -.07, SE(B) = .03, z = -1.94, p = .054, and condition, B = 
.03, SE(B) = .20, z = .15, p = .88. At step two the two-way interaction between 
condition and brooding was added which did not explain a statistically 
significant amount of variance, B = -.02, SE(B) = .05, z = -.32, p = .75. 
Following this, goal-level predictors were added to the model, starting with AM 
specificity pre-manipulation at step three, which did not explain a statistically 
significant amount of variance, B = -.13, SE(B) = .20, z = -.67, p = .50. Next, 
goal importance was entered at step four, which did explain a statistically 
significant amount of variance, B = -.13, SE(B) = .06, z = 2.26, p < .05. At step 
five a two-way interaction between goal importance and condition was entered 
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which did not explain a statistically significant amount of variance, B = .06, 
SE(B) = .12, z = .50, p = .61. An interaction between goal importance and 
brooding was also entered at this step which did not explain a statistically 
significant amount of variance, B = .01, SE(B) = .02, z = .75, p = .45. Finally, at 
step six the critical three-way interaction was entered between goal 
importance, condition and brooding, which did not explain a statistically 
significant amount of variance, B = -.009, SE(B) = .03, z = -.26, p = .79. Failing 
to support hypothesis 2, the final model (Table 5) indicates that goal 
importance did not predict unique variance in AM specificity post-manipulation, 
in participants high in brooding, in the unresolved condition. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Two-level Random Intercept Model Coefficients Exploring the 
Association of AM Specificity at Pre-manipulation, Depressive Symptoms, 
Brooding, Condition and Goal Importance on AM Specificity Post-manipulation 
   SE (B) z p (2-
tailed) 
Fixed effects 
 
    
Person-level variables 
 
    
AM specificity pre-manipulation 
 
.01  .06 .13 .90 
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) 
 
.03 .32 .10 .92 
Brooding (RRS-B) 
 
-.06 .05 -1.24 .21 
Condition 
 
.03 .20 .15 .88 
Condition x brooding 
 
-.02 .06 -.31 .76 
Goal-level variables 
 
    
AM specificity pre-manipulation 
 
-.13 .20 -.68 1.50 
Goal importance 
 
-.17 .09 -1.85 .06 
Goal importance x condition 
 
.07 .12 .56 .58 
Goal importance x brooding 
 
.02 .03 .67 .50 
Goal importance x condition x 
brooding 
 
-.01 .03 -.26 .79 
Random effect u0j (SE) 
 
.19 
(.12) 
   
Note. The overall model was not statistically significant. AM specificity pre-
manipulation was coded as 0 = not specific, 1 = specific.  
Goal progress-discrepancy ratings. After person-level predictors (AM 
specificity pre-manipulation, depressive symptoms, brooding and condition) 
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were added at step one, none predicted statistically significant amounts of 
variance in AM specificity post-manipulation: AM specificity pre-manipulation, 
B = -.03, SE(B) = .05, z = -.50, p = .62, depressive symptoms, B = -.30, SE(B) 
= .27, z = -1.10, p = .27, brooding, B = -.07, SE(B) = .03, z = -1.94, p = .05, 
and condition, B = .03, SE(B) = .20, z = .15, p = .88. At step two, the two-way 
interaction between condition and brooding was added, which did not explain 
a statistically significant amount of variance, B = -.02, SE(B) = .06, z = -.32, p 
= .75. Following this, goal-level predictors were added to the model, starting 
with AM specificity pre-manipulation at step three, which did not explain a 
statistically significant amount of variance, B = -.13, SE(B) = .20, z = -.67, p = 
.50. Next, goal progress-discrepancy was entered at step four, which did not 
explain a statistically significant amount of variance, B = .09, SE(B) = .05, z = 
1.78, p = .08. At step five, a two-way interaction between goal progress-
discrepancy and condition was entered, which did not explain a statistically 
significant amount of variance, B = -.02, SE(B) = .10, z = -.22, p = .83. An 
interaction between goal progress-discrepancy and brooding was also entered 
at this step which did not explain a statistically significant amount of variance, 
B = .002, SE(B) = .02, z = -.13, p = .89. Critically, at step six a three-way 
interaction was entered between goal progress-discrepancy, condition and 
brooding which did not explain a statistically significant amount of variance, B 
= .03, SE(B) = .03, z = .11, p = .91. Failing to support hypothesis 2, the final 
model indicates that goal progress-discrepancy did not predict unique variance 
in AM specificity post-manipulation, in participants higher in brooding, in the 
unresolved condition (Table 6). 
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 Table 6 
Summary of Two-level Random Intercept Model Coefficients Exploring the 
Association of AM Specificity Pre-manipulation, Depressive Symptoms, 
Brooding, Condition and Goal Progress-Discrepancy on AM Specificity Post-
manipulation 
   SE (B) z p (2-
tailed) 
Fixed effects 
 
    
Person-level variables 
 
    
AM specificity pre-manipulation 
 
.01 .06 .18 .86 
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) 
 
.03 .32 .09 .93 
Brooding (RRS-B) 
 
-.06 .05 -1.24 .21 
Condition 
 
.03 .20 .13 .90 
Condition x brooding 
 
-.02 .06 -.34 .73 
Goal-level variables 
 
    
AM Specificity pre-manipulation 
 
-.16 .20 -.79 .43 
Goal progress-discrepancy 
 
.11 .08 1.45 .15 
Goal progress-discrepancy x condition 
 
-.02 .10 -.22 .83 
Goal progress-discrepancy x brooding 
 
-.02 .02 -.95 .34 
Goal progress-discrepancy x condition x 
brooding 
 
.03 .03 1.13 .26 
Random effect u0j (SE) 
 
.19 
(.12) 
   
Note. The overall model was not statistically significant. AM specificity pre-
manipulation was coded as 0 = not specific, 1 = specific. 
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MI-AMT goal-cue relevance to concern ratings. After person-level 
predictors (AM specificity pre-manipulation, depressive symptoms, brooding 
and condition) were added at step one, none predicted statistically significant 
amounts of variance in AM specificity post-manipulation: AM specificity pre-
manipulation, B = -.03, SE(B) = .06, z = -.50, p = .62, depressive symptoms, B 
= -.30, SE(B) = .27, z = -1.10, p = .27, brooding, B = -.07, SE(B) = .03, z = -
1.94, p = .05, and condition, B = .03, SE(B) = .20, z = .15, p = .88. At step two, 
the two-way interaction between condition and brooding was added which did 
not explain a statistically significant amount of variance, B = -.02, SE(B) = .05, 
z = -.32, p = .75. Following this, goal-level predictors were added to the model, 
starting with AM specificity pre-manipulation at step three, which did not 
explain a statistically significant amount of variance, B = -.13, SE(B) = .20, z = 
-.67, p = .50. Next, goal-cue relevance was entered at step four, which did 
explain a statistically significant amount of variance, B = -.10, SE(B) = .05, z = 
-1.98, p <.05. At step five a two-way interaction between goal-cue relevance 
and condition was entered which also explained a statistically significant 
amount of variance, B = .30, SE(B) = .12, z = 2.79, p = .005. Plotting this 
interaction (Figure 4), revealed the following pattern: within the resolved goal 
condition, goal-cue relevance was negatively associated with AM specificity; 
within the unresolved goal condition, goal-cue relevance was not associated 
with AM specificity. The slope for resolved condition was significant, B = -.25, 
SE(B) = .08, z = -3.18, p < .01. The slope for unresolved condition was not 
significant, B = .05, SE(B) = .07, z = .67, p = .50. An interaction between goal-
cue relevance and brooding was also entered at step five, which did not 
explain a statistically significant amount of variance, B = .02, SE(B) = .02, z = 
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1.13, p = .26. Critically, at step six a three-way interaction was entered 
between goal-cue relevance, condition and brooding, which did not explain a 
statistically significant amount of variance, B = -.01, SE(B) = .17, z = -.08, p = 
.93. Failing to support hypothesis 2, the final model indicates that goal-cue 
relevance did not predict unique variance in AM specificity post-manipulation, 
in participants high in brooding, in the unresolved condition (Table 7). 
 
Figure 4. AM specificity post-manipulation (log odds) for low and high goal-cue 
relevance to concern (predicted values plotted when the pre-manipulation AM 
was non-specific). Goal-cue relevance to concern ratings were centred so that 
0 represented the mean. Low and high relevance scores represent less than, 
and more than, one standard deviation from the mean, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Summary of Two-level Random Intercept Model Coefficients Exploring the 
Association of AM Specificity Pre-manipulation, Depressive Symptoms, 
Brooding, Condition and Goal-cue Relevance on AM Specificity Post-
manipulation 
   SE (B) z p (2-
tailed) 
Fixed effects 
 
    
Person-level variables 
 
    
AM specificity pre-manipulation 
 
.004 .06 .06 .95 
Depressive symptoms (BDI-II) 
 
.04 .32 .11 .91 
Brooding (RRS-B) 
 
-.05 .05 -1.15 2.71 
Condition 
 
.06 .20 .29 .77 
Condition x brooding 
 
-.02 .06 -.39 .70 
Goal-level variables 
 
    
AM Specificity pre-manipulation  
 
-.12 .20 -.54 .59 
Goal cue relevance 
 
-.27 .08 -3.33 .0008 
Goal cue relevance x condition 
 
.31 .11 1.21 .23 
Goal cue relevance x brooding 
 
.02 .02 1.14 .25 
Goal cue relevance x condition x 
brooding 
 
-.01 .03 -.47 .64 
Random effect u0j (SE) 
 
.20 
(.12) 
   
Note. The overall model was not statistically significant. AM specificity pre-
manipulation was coded as 0 = not specific, 1 = specific.  
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Discussion 
To the best of the experimenter’s knowledge this is the first study to 
investigate the relationship between OGM, goal-progress and related 
ruminative processes as informed by the SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) and control theories of rumination (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Martin & Tesser, 2006). Support for this study’s first hypothesis that, at the 
between-person level, induced rumination over unresolved goals would lead to 
higher levels of OGM than induced focus on resolved goals amongst 
individuals high in trait brooding, was not found. Secondly, this study 
hypothesised that, at the within-person level, the expected change in AM 
specificity would be greater for AMs associated with (a) more important goals; 
(b) goals on which progress is poorer; (c) goals rated as more relevant to the 
concern identified in a goal cueing task. Support for this hypothesis was not 
found.  
Induced rumination over unresolved goals did not lead to higher levels of 
OGM amongst individuals high in trait brooding. When operationalised as 
number of specific AMs, but not categoric AMs, AM specificity following the 
induction was predicted by brooding, after controlling for AM specificity pre-
manipulation and depressive symptoms. Debeer et al.’s (2009) extension of 
Williams et al.’s (2007) CaR mechanism, suggests that brooding, a 
subcomponent of rumination, rather than depressive rumination in general, 
contributes to and maintains OGM due to its self-discrepant nature. That 
brooding was negatively associated with change in AM specificity regardless 
of condition (i.e., self-discrepant rumination versus non self-discrepant focus) 
suggests that an interaction between brooding and processing related to the 
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self more generally, rather than self-discrepancy, increases AM overgenerality. 
For example, abstract, analytic forms of rumination in combination with lower 
levels of differentiation of schematic models of the self has been found to be 
positively associated with elevated retrieval of categoric AMs (Eldridge, 
Barnard, & Bekerian, 1994). It has been suggested that avenues for further 
research on OGM should consider the extent of self-representation 
differentiation as well as the mode of processing (Barnard, Watkins, & 
Ramponi, 2006). 
MLM was used to explore whether any effect of condition and brooding 
on AM specificity might be more apparent when taken in combination with MI-
AMT goal-cue characteristics. The extent to which people high on brooding 
were less specific in the unresolved condition was not found to depend on the 
importance or progress-discrepancy ratings of the goal-statements from which 
the MI-AMT cues were developed, nor on the relevance of the goal-cues to the 
concern identified in the goal cueing task. For AMs related to goals that were 
rated as more important to participants’ identified concerns, there was a 
statistically significant decrease in specificity following the induction, after 
controlling for person-level variables and AM specificity pre-manipulation at 
the goal-level. Thus, being induced to focus on goals (resolved or unresolved) 
was associated with less specificity of AMs related to important concerns. 
Research has shown an effect of using the AMT on AM specificity whereby 
number of AMT trials was positively associated with OGM (Roberts, Carlos, & 
Kashdan, 2006). Although speculative, it may be that for cues relating to 
certain types of important goals, all individuals tend to get more or less specific 
over time when tested with the AMT e.g., for AMs related to more important 
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goals, individuals may become less specific, the more they retrieve. 
Alternatively, processing relevant to the self in general (i.e., in both conditions) 
may be associated with decreases in specificity for AMs related to important 
goals. 
Of the goal-level variables, only goal-cue relevance ratings showed a 
significant main effect on AM specificity qualified by an interaction with 
condition. That importance and progress ratings did not show a significant 
main effect on AM specificity is inconsistent with assumptions that follow from 
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) theory of OGM: if specific AMs are self-
discrepant, the hierarchical AM retrieval process becomes aborted at a more 
abstract level of specificity in order to maintain self-coherence. Whilst goal-cue 
relevance ratings were made in relation to participants’ idiosyncratic concerns 
as identified in the goal cueing task, importance and progress ratings were 
obtained in relation to the goal-statements presented one week prior to the 
manipulation. Hence, whilst importance and progress-discrepancy ratings 
were cue-relevant variables, these did not directly measure the concerns 
identified in the goal cueing task. It may be that the effects of factors relevant 
to the manipulation were more powerful than factors relevant to the individual 
goal-cues. In terms of the significant interaction between goal-cue relevance 
and condition, participants reported decreasingly specific AMs in response to 
cues related to the concern after the resolved goal manipulation, whereas no 
such relationship was observed after the unresolved goal manipulation. This 
pattern was not expected and contradicts Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s 
(2000) self-coherence maintenance theory of OGM. Although speculative, 
these findings are partly consistent with the Zeigarnik effect whereby specific 
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representations of AMs relating to goals are less likely to be available following 
the resolution of those goals (Zeigarnik, 1938). However, this finding awaits 
replication.  
In this study, high brooders did not display increased OGM when 
induced to ruminate over unresolved goals compared to being induced to 
focus on resolved goals, when cued by more important and self-relevant 
goals. Raes et al. (2012) suggests that the activation of state rumination, a 
form of discrepancy-based processing (Watkins, 2008), enables the detection 
of a positive association between rumination and OGM amongst PDs and non-
clinical samples. State rumination has been found to moderate the association 
between self-discrepancy and OGM amongst PDs (Crane et al., 2007a). 
According to Martin and Tesser’s (2006) goal-progress theory, state 
rumination is predicted to result from perceived insufficient progress towards 
goals that are more personally important and that rumination is likely to be 
cued by unresolved goal-related stimuli. The current study did not utilise a 
measure of state rumination making it impossible to determine whether it was 
successfully induced by the unresolved goal manipulation. However, findings 
relating to participants’ mood, self-focus and concern ratings were consistent 
with those reported by Roberts et al. (2013) suggesting that the task operated 
as expected. Specifically, participant mood ratings indicated a statistically 
significant decrease in happiness in the unresolved goal condition compared 
to the resolved goal condition. This would be expected because negative 
repetitive thought tends to be associated with exacerbation of negative mood 
(Watkins, 2008). Roberts et al. (2013) found that the manipulation successfully 
induced differential state rumination and that this was more pronounced for 
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individuals higher in trait rumination. It is surprising that number of specific 
AMs pre-manipulation did not significantly predict number of specific AMs 
post-manipulation. This lowers confidence in the predictive validity of the MI-
AMT. It should also be noted that brooding was not significantly associated 
with AM specificity pre-manipulation. This is inconsistent with the literature that 
has reported positive associations between brooding and OGM (Romero, 
Vasquez, & Sanchez, 2014). These observations strengthen the possibilities 
that (a) the methodology used was insufficiently sensitive to detect a 
relationship between brooding and OGM; (b) levels of brooding in this non-
clinical sample were not sufficiently extreme to show an effect on OGM.      
The null findings of this study may suggest that OGM might be positively 
associated with trait brooding only under stressful conditions. Elaborating 
control theory, Watkins (2008, 2011) suggests that rumination can be 
unconstructive under conditions of stress, whereby individuals are less able to 
specify how higher-level reference values translate into subordinate goals and 
concrete behaviour, the achievement of which serves to meet the higher-order 
goals. Depression, in which OGM is observed, might constitute “stress”. 
Perhaps there was no main effect of condition on increases in OGM, an 
unconstructive consequence of rumination (Sumner et al., 2014), because the 
sample comprised high functioning, non-clinical participants who were likely 
more able, than CDs, to specify concrete subordinate goals in order to achieve 
their unresolved goals. Perhaps inductions of conditions of more acute stress 
or low mood would impair participants’ ability to generate the subordinate 
goals necessary for high-order goal attainment and increases in OGM.  
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The null findings of this study may also suggest that goal-discrepancies 
among high brooders are unimportant in predicting OGM in non-clinical 
samples. Although brooding and reflection have been described as 
maladaptive and adaptive components of rumination respectively (Treynor et 
al., 2003), conclusions about whether reflection is positively associated with 
OGM are equivocal (Surrence, Miranda, Marroquin, & Chan, 2009). Subtypes 
of rumination are not described in Martin and Tesser’s (2006) goal-progress 
theory. It would be of interest to explore whether high reflectors become less 
specific when induced to ruminate over unresolved goals as a function of lack 
of progress on important and/or relevant goals. This would be unexpected 
because reflection has been conceptualised as a concrete, specific form of 
self-focus compared to brooding (Watkins, 2008), and so is not directly 
implicated in Williams et al.’s (2007) CaR mechanism. Additionally, brooding, 
but not reflection, has been found to mediate the relationship between higher 
levels of depressive symptoms and OGM in a non-clinical sample (Debeer et 
al., 2009).  
This study has several limitations. The predominantly female student 
sample limits the generalisability of the results to the wider population. Ros et 
al. (2013) found a positive association between depressive symptoms and 
OGM amongst women, but not men and suggested that the role of OGM in 
depression may be more important in women than in men. Roberts et al. 
(2013) used the sustained attention to response task (SART; Robertson, 
Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) as a valid and sensitive measure of 
state rumination. The SART was not used in the current study as a 
manipulation check due to the risk of increased fatigue effects that may have 
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diluted the manipulation’s influence on AM. However, the use of such a 
measure would have enabled clearer conclusions about whether state 
rumination, when activated in high brooding individuals, was associated with 
increased OGM. Assuming that the manipulation differentially induced state 
rumination, this would not appear to be the case. A simple, less time-
consuming measure than the SART would have been to ask participants to 
rate the extent to which they were experiencing thoughts about the resolved or 
unresolved goal, using a Likert-type scale.  
The findings of this study are inconsistent with predictions that were 
derived from an integration of the SMS model (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000), extensions of Williams et al.’s (2007) CaR mechanism (Debeer, 
Hermans, & Raes, 2009) and control theories of rumination (Martin & Tesser, 
1996, 2006): self-discrepancy was not significantly related to increased OGM 
as a function of lack of progress on important and/or relevant goals amongst 
high brooders. This could be because the manipulation did not successfully 
induce state rumination. Assuming that the manipulation did successfully 
induce state rumination, these null findings may suggest that rumination over 
unresolved goals does not predict increased OGM amongst non-clinical 
samples. Given that Williams et al.’s (2007) theory was constructed to 
understand OGM in CDs, a replication of this study with a clinical sample 
would be a useful next step in investigating derivate predictions about the 
effect of goal-discrepancy rumination on OGM. It would be useful to expand on 
these preliminary findings because a greater understanding of the relationship 
between goals and OGM may contribute towards more effective treatments for 
depression (Moore & Zoellner, 2007).  
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Appendices 
A. Additional method measures information 
1. Ruminative Responses Scale-Brooding (RRS-B; Treynor et al., 
2003) 
2. Generation of memory cues 
3. Minimal Instruction Autobiographical Memory Test (MI-AMT; 
Debeer et al., 2009) 
4. Goal cueing task (Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013)  
5. MI-AMT (Debeer et al., 2009) goal-cue relevance ratings 
6. Mood ratings 
7. Mood neutralising exercises 
B. Extended data analysis 
1. Data screening procedure 
2. Goal cueing task concern ratings 
3. Mood and self-focus ratings 
4. Between-subjects variables correlation matrix 
C. Participant pack  
1. Information sheets 
i. Information sheet for phase one 
ii. Information sheet for phase two 
2. Informed consent forms 
i. Informed consent form for phase one 
ii. Informed consent form for phase two 
3. Debriefing form (for both phases) 
D. Ethics documentation 
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1. University ethics approval for empirical study 
2. University ethics approval for survey for generation of memory 
cues 
E. Dissemination statement 
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Appendix A: Additional Method Measures Information 
1. Ruminative Responses Scale-Brooding (RRS-B; Treynor et al., 
2003). 
People think and do many different things when they feel down, sad or 
depressed. Please read each of the items below and indicate whether you 
never, sometimes, often, or always think or do each one when you feel down, 
sad or depressed. Please indicate what you generally do, not what you think 
you should do. 
 
 
Almost              Almost  
Never      Sometimes      Often      Always 
 
1. Think “Why do I always react this 
way?” 
 
2. Think about a recent situation, 
wishing it had gone better 
 
3. Think “Why do I have problems 
other people don’t have?” 
 
4. Think “What am I doing to deserve 
this?” 
 
5. Think “Why can’t I handle things 
better?” 
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2. Generation of memory cues. 
The experimenter selected the first 10 conceptually distinct clusters 
from Chulef, Read and Walsh’s (2001) taxonomy of human goals. Chulef et al. 
(2001) asked participants to sort goals into piles based on conceptual 
similarity. The authors found that people rated goals as similarly important to 
them within the clusters and provided a diagrammatic scale which could be 
used to measure the conceptual distinctiveness of each cluster. The 10 most 
distinct goals were selected in order to reduce the likelihood that the meaning 
of the goals would be confounded with each other. These were: 
1. sex/romance,  
2. marriage/family,  
3. physical appearance/health,  
4. belongingness/ recognition/ friendship 
5. leadership/mentoring/support,  
6. religion/spirituality,  
7. social awareness/ethics/freedom,  
8. aesthetics/creativity/openness,  
9. well-being/growth/achievement,  
10. career/education,  
To convert clusters into goal statements the experimenter and an 
independent rater worded them according to the overall conceptual meaning 
of the items included until inter-rater agreement was achieved. For example, 
for the goal ‘marriage/family’ the goal construct ‘To have good relations with 
my family’ was created. Discrepancies were resolved through discussion. 
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Inter-rater reliability was calculated as kappa = .82. The resulting goal 
statements were: 
1. To have an intimate romantic relationship 
2. To have good relations with my family 
3. To look physically attractive 
4. To maintain good friendships 
5. To positively influence others 
6. To be in touch with my spirituality 
7. To live according to moral principles 
8. To appreciate the creative arts 
9. To strive for personal improvement 
10. To get a good education 
Using a thesaurus the experimenter selected approximately 20 adjectives 
and 20 nouns for each goal statement that corresponded in meaning to that 
goal statement. Word frequencies as recorded in and Francis and Kučera 
(1982) for each word were recorded. It was subsequently decided that 
adjectives were closer to the types of cue word usually used on the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) and so 
nouns were disregarded. From the remaining pool of approximately 160 
adjectives 41 with similar word count frequencies were selected so that each 
goal statement had either 4 or 5 corresponding to that goal statement. 
 An online survey was created using www.psychsurveys.org whereby 
adjectives were rated on 7-point Likert-type scales for (a) emotionality, with 
scores ranging from 1 (unemotional) to 7 (very emotional); (b) imageability, 
with scores ranging from 1 (not very easy to visualise) to 7 (very easy to 
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visualise); (c) familiarity, with scores ranging from 1 (unfamiliar) to 7 (very 
familiar). Semantic correspondence between all adjectives and goal 
statements was also rated with scores ranging from 1 (dissimilar) to 7 (very 
similar). The survey was advertised online to undergraduate psychology 
participants at the University of Exeter. Participants were offered course 
credits for taking part. Two samples were recruited across all ratings to reduce 
fatigue effects. Between 12.03.14 and 01.04.14, 19 participants with a mean 
age of 19.42 years (SD = 1.61, range = 18-25) rated the adjectives for 
imageability, familiarity and emotionality. During this same period 23 
undergraduate psychology students with a mean age of 19.17 (SD = 1.47, 
range = 18-25) rated the adjectives for relevance. Inclusion criteria were 
having English as a native language in order to decrease variance between 
subjects’ conceptual interpretation of adjectives.  
 The mean, standard deviation and range scores were calculated for 
each adjective. First, for each goal statement the adjective that had the 
highest mean rating over 4 and the lowest mean rating below 4 was 
highlighted. At this stage it was found that all adjectives corresponding to five 
goal statements (statements 2, 4, 7, 9 and 10) were rated as highly relevant 
(mean ratings of 4 or higher) to goal statement 5. Additionally, all adjectives 
corresponding to goal statements 9 and 10 were rated as highly similar (mean 
rating of 4 or higher) to each other. Therefore, in order to maximise conceptual 
distinction between goal statements and their corresponding goal statements 5 
and 9 were disregarded, leaving the following eight goal statements: 
1. To have an intimate romantic relationship 
2. To have good relations with my family 
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3. To look physically attractive 
4. To maintain good friendships 
5. To be in touch with my spirituality 
6. To live according to moral principles 
7. To appreciate the creative arts 
8. To get a good education 
For each of the eight remaining goal statements the experimenter 
selected two corresponding adjectives that had been rated as closely as 
possible to the standard of having high mean relevance ratings to the 
statement (4 and higher), low mean relevance ratings to other statements (4 
and lower), high mean familiarity ratings (4 or over), low mean emotionality 
ratings (4 or under) and high mean imageability ratings (4 or over). Although 
all four dimensions (relevance, familiarity, emotionality and imageability) were 
considered important in order to reduce possible differences between cues 
which could have confounded the results, priority was given to relevance 
ratings to ensure as close a match as possible between cues and goals 
because not having conceptually distinct goal statements would have 
undermined the internal logic of the study. The final set of cue word pairs for 
each goal statement was rated similarly highly on emotionality, familiarity, 
imageability, and relevance. For each pair adjectives were assigned to set A 
or set B so that one adjective for each goal was represented in each set, with 
approximately balanced mean ratings on each variable (relevance, familiarity, 
emotionality and imageability). Again, priority was on balancing relevance. 
This process involved comparing every possible order of each pair of goal 
cues for each goal statement with every other pair of goal cues for each goal 
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statement. To do this the mean of mean ratings for each cue in each set for 
each AB combination on each variable was calculated. Then the difference 
between means for each variable was calculated. Following this the sum of 
squared differences was calculated and the AB set with the sum of squared 
difference score closest to 0 was selected. The following is a list of the goal 
statements and their corresponding adjectives for set A: 
1. To have an intimate romantic relationship; Romantic 
2. To have good relations with my family; Parental 
3. To look physically attractive; Stylish 
4. To maintain good friendships; Liked 
5. To be in touch with my spirituality; Spiritual 
6. To live according to moral principles; Humane 
7. To appreciate the creative arts; Artistic  
8. To get a good education; Studious 
Similarly, set B was:  
1. To have an intimate romantic relationship; Erotic 
2. To have good relations with my family; Family-orientated 
3. To look physically attractive; Good-looking 
4. To maintain good friendships; Popular 
5. To be in touch with my spirituality; Religious 
6. To live according to moral principles; Ethical 
7. To appreciate the creative arts; Imaginative 
8. To get a good education; Scholarly 
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Sets A and B were used as Minimal Instruction Autobiographical Memory Test 
(MI-AMT; Debeer et al., 2009) cues. 
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Appendix A: Additional Method Measures Information  
3. Minimal Instruction Autobiographical Memory Test (MI-AMT; 
Debeer et al., 2009). 
For each goal-cue the following sentence frame was presented to 
participants, whereby “[GOAL-CUE]” represents the goal-cues as listed in 
Appendix A2: “Can you write down an event than [GOAL-CUE] remind you 
of?” For example, for the goal-cue “religious” participants were presented with 
the instructions “Can you write down an event than religious remind you of?”  
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4. Goal cueing task (Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013). 
Goal manipulation protocol. Script that was delivered over headphones is 
italicised.  
1. Unresolved goal (experimental condition): 
For the next ten minutes I am going to ask you to close your eyes and focus 
your attention on a problem and difficulty that is still unresolved and bothering 
you –so this is an ongoing and unresolved concern that has been repeatedly 
coming in to your mind over the past week and causing you to feel negative, 
sad, down or stressed.  
When I ask you to begin, please close your eyes and dwell on this current 
problem or concern, in the way that you usually dwell on and ruminate about 
unresolved concerns, as intensely as you can, until I ask you to stop and to 
open your eyes. 
Examples of the kind of difficulty that I would like you think about are... (Give 
example topics). 
Example topics: 
An ongoing concern about an important relationship, which you feel that you 
should be managing better. 
A recent negative event and its impact upon how you have been feeling over 
the past few weeks. 
Concerns that you have failed to achieve a goal that is of personal importance 
to you. 
Feeling that you disappoint someone who means a lot to you. 
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Feeling that you do not compare favourably to other people with respect to an 
area of functioning that is important to you. 
The problem or difficulty that you think about must be one that has been 
repeatedly troubling you recently and that you have not resolved, that is, it still 
bothers you and still comes repeatedly to mind. 
Can you think of a problem or difficulty of this kind to think about?  
If no remind participant of examples and give them some time to think of a 
suitable topic. If yes proceed as follows: 
Would you mind telling me very briefly what the problem is?  
If not an appropriate topic remind participant of the type of concern that we are 
interested in and the examples and give further time to try to identify a concern 
of this kind. 
Now I would like you to evaluate this difficulty using the following scales.  
Six 9-point Likert-type scale items are presented on the computer screen. 
Responses range from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Participants are asked to 
rate their identified concern in relation to the following items: (a) how important 
it is to you; (b) how much it bothers you now; (c) how much it did bother you at 
the time it was worst; (d) how much you have been thinking about it over the 
last week; (e) how long has this been a difficulty for you; (f) how much does 
this difficulty relate to more general concerns that you have.  
Please close your eyes and dwell on this current problem or concern, in the 
way that you usually dwell on and ruminate about unresolved concerns, as 
intensely as you can, until I ask you to stop and to open your eyes.” 
Recorded script items: 
Think about the problem and difficulty – what is it? 
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Focus on what about this problem/difficulty bothers and troubles you.  
Think about what is important about this difficulty in terms of your personal 
goals. 
Focus on how this problem reflects a lack of progress on important personal 
goals. 
Think about how the problem/difficulty is still unresolved. 
Concentrate on the aspects of the problem that reflect unfinished business 
Focus on the aspects of the difficulty that repeatedly come to mind. 
Think about any related concerns and unresolved issues that this problem 
reminds you of.  
2. Resolved goal: 
For the next few minutes I am going to ask you to close your eyes and focus 
your attention on a recent problem or difficulty that is now resolved and no 
longer bothering you –so this is an past and resolved difficulty that has not 
been coming in to your mind over the past week and no longer causes you to 
feel negative, sad, down or stressed. When I ask you to begin, please close 
your eyes and think about this past problem or concern, in the way that you 
usually think about resolved concerns, as intensely as you can, until I ask you 
to stop and to open your eyes. 
Examples of the kind of difficulty that I would like you think about are... (Give 
example topics) 
Example topics: 
A concern that you would not achieve a goal that you have now succeeded in 
achieving. 
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A past dispute with someone who means a lot to you that has now been 
resolved and you now feel very positively about this relationship. 
A situation or event that you had been finding stressful, but that you have now 
learned to manage well. 
An area of functioning that is important to you, and which you previously felt 
you did not manage well, but that you now manage as well as other people. 
A negative event that happened many years ago and that you have now come 
to terms with and are not troubled by. 
The problem or difficulty that you think about must be one that has not been 
troubling you recently and that you have now resolved. 
Can you think of a problem or difficulty of this kind to think about?  
If no remind participant of examples and give them some time to think of a 
suitable topic. If yes proceed as follows: 
Would you mind telling me very briefly what the problem was?  
If not appropriate remind participant of the type of concern that we are 
interested in and the examples and give further time to try to identify a concern 
of this kind. 
Now I would like you to evaluate this difficulty using the following scales.  
Six 9-point Likert-type scale items are presented on the computer screen. 
Responses range from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). Participants are asked to 
rate their identified concern in relation to the following items: (a) how important 
it is to you; (b) how much it bothers you now; (c) how much it did bother you at 
the time it was worst; (d) how much you have been thinking about it over the 
last week; (e) how long has this been a difficulty for you; (f) how much does 
this difficulty relate to more general concerns that you have.  
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 Please close your eyes and think about this past problem or concern, in the 
way that you usually think about past resolved difficulties, as intensely as you 
can, until I ask you to stop and to open your eyes.” 
Recorded script items: 
Think about the problem and difficulty – what was it? 
Focus on what about this problem/difficulty bothered and troubled you in the 
past. 
Think about what was important about this difficulty in terms of your personal 
goals. 
Focus on how resolving this problem reflects progress on important personal 
goals. 
Think about how the problem/difficulty is now resolved. 
Concentrate on the aspects of the problem that are now finished and dealt 
with.  
Think about any other resolved difficulties that this problem reminds you of.  
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Appendix A: Additional Method Measures Information 
5. MI-AMT (Debeer et al., 2009) goal-cue relevance ratings. 
For each goal-cue the following instructions were presented to 
participants, whereby “[GOAL-CUE]” represents the goal-cues as listed in 
Appendix A2: “How relevant is the word [GOAL-CUE] to the concern you 
identified in the previous thinking exercise?” For example, for the goal-cue 
“religious” participants were presented with the instructions “How relevant is 
the word religious to the concern you identified in the previous thinking 
exercise?” Scores ranged from 1 (irrelevant) to 7 (highly relevant). 
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Appendix A: Additional Method Measures Information 
6. Mood ratings. 
At each of the five time points as described in the “procedure” section 
participants were asked (a) “How happy are you feeling right now?”; (b) “How 
sad are you feeling right now?”; (c) “How self-focussed are you feeling right 
now?” Responses were made on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very). 
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Appendix A: Additional Method Measures Information 
7. Mood neutralising exercises. 
The experimenter ran a focus group with 5 adult members of a Lived 
Experience Group at the University of Exeter on 03.03.14. The members were 
shown amusing film clips and asked to brainstorm what clips they thought 
might be appropriate for participants who may be experiencing low mood 
and/or who had received the rumination induction. The film clips that were 
voted as most appropriate were a 3 minute 49 second clip from the film 
Mamma Mia (Craymer, Goetzman, & Lloyd, 2008) during which the song 
Dancing Queen was performed and a 58 second clip from the film Love 
Actually during which Hugh Grant dances (Bevan, Kenworthy, & Curtis, 2003).  
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Appendix B: Extended Data Analysis 
1. Data screening procedure. 
Seventeen data points representing more than 3 standard deviations 
from the mean were detected across scores from the Likert-type scale 
variables. These were retained in the analysis because (1) replacing them with 
the mean value plus two SDs (Field, 2009) created new outliers, and (2) they 
did not indicate any biased participant responding. For the categorical data 
value totals and ranges using frequency tables were inspected and no outliers 
were detected.  
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the 
assumptions of normality, linearity, multicolillnearity and homoscedasticity. 
BDI-II score was log transformed to correct for skewed distribution. Brooding 
was mean-centred as this is recommended to provide more easily 
interpretable results (Aiken & West, 1991). 
  
  130 
Appendix B: Extended Data Analysis 
2. Goal cueing task concern ratings. 
Participants in the unresolved condition reported having spent a greater 
proportion of time thinking about their goal in the past week, t (76) = -9.05, p < 
.001, 
2 = .01 (M = 6.95, SD = 1.36) than participants in the resolved condition 
(M = 3.05, SD = 2.3), and being more bothered by the goal, t (76) = -11.28, p < 
.001, 
2 = 0.01 (M = 7.33, SD = 1.14) than participants in the resolved goal 
condition (M = 2.95, SD = 2.12). This was as intended and consistent with 
Roberts et al. (2013). There was no significant effect of condition on 
participants’ evaluation of how much the goal had bothered them at its worst 
(p > .7), the importance of the goal (p > .1), how long the goal had been a 
difficulty (p > .3), or how much the goal related to general goals and concerns 
(p > 0.1). Thus, the goals identified in the two conditions did not differ in 
subjective evaluations of their nature or severity, but participants in the 
unresolved goal condition reported that the goal was bothering them more 
than participants in the resolved goal condition. 
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Appendix B: Extended Data Analysis 
3. Mood and self-focus ratings. 
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for happiness/sadness/self-focus 
at each of the time points after the first time they were rated in the unresolved 
and resolved goal conditions.  
Table 8 
Descriptive Characteristics for Happiness, Sadness and Self-Focus Ratings at 
Times 2, 3, 4 and 5 in the Unresolved and Resolved Goal Conditions.  
 Time 2  
(post MI-AMT 
time 1, pre-
manipulation) 
Time 3  
(post-
manipulation) 
Time 4 
(post MI-AMT 
time 2) 
Time 5 
(post mood 
neutralising 
task) 
 Unres. 
 
Res. Unres. Res. Unres. Res. Unres. Res. 
Happiness 4.93 
(1.25) 
 
5.21 
(.88) 
3.45 
(1.11) 
4.84 
(1.37) 
4.40 
(1.19) 
5.21 
(1.12) 
5.28 
(1.09) 
5.95 
(1.01) 
Sadness 2.53 
(1.11) 
 
2.37 
(1.24) 
3.95 
(1.57) 
2.71 
(1.41) 
2.92 
(1.23) 
2.37 
(1.34) 
2.40 
(1.08) 
1.82 
(1.16) 
Self-focus 5.25 
(1.08) 
5.29 
(1.14) 
4.80 
(1.44) 
5.37 
(1.58) 
4.73 
(1.22) 
5.16 
(1.33) 
3.70 
(1.29) 
4.08 
(1.65) 
 
Note. Unres = unresolved goal condition; res = resolved goal condition. 
Mean happiness ratings became greater across conditions from time 4 
(mean = 4.79, SD = 1.22) to time 5 (mean = 5.50, SD = 1.10) and sadness 
ratings became smaller from time 4 (mean = 2.65, SD = 1.31) to time 5 (mean 
= 2.12, SD = 1.15) indicating that as intended, the mood neutralising task 
improved participants’ mood post-manipulation. All participants reported lower 
rates of happiness and increased rates of sadness from pre- to post 
manipulation. This difference was statistically significant for sadness ratings 
amongst participants in the unresolved condition, t(39) = -6.38, p < .01 and in 
  132 
the resolved condition, t(37) = -2.12, p = .04. This difference was statistically 
significant for happiness ratings amongst participants in the unresolved but not 
the resolved condition, t(39) = 8.79, p < .05. Levels of self-focus did not 
statistically significantly differ from pre- to post-manipulation in either condition.  
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Appendix B: Extended Data Analysis 
8. Between-subjects variables correlation matrix. 
Table 9 
Between-subjects Pearson Product-moment Correlations Among and 
Descriptive Statistics for Gender, Depressive Symptoms, Trait Brooding, AM 
Specificity Pre-manipulation 
 M (SD) Gender BDI 
score 
 
RRS-B  No. spec 
AMs pre-
man 
 
No. cat 
AMs pre-
man 
 
Gender 
 
.17 (.38)  -.19 -.07 -.01 -.10 
BDI score 
 
.95 (.34)   .52** .13 .06 
RRS-B 
 
-.00 (3.60)    .13 .04 
No. spec 
AMs pre-man 
 
3.28 (1.82)     -.70** 
No. cat AMs 
pre-man 
 
2.46 (1.67)      
Note.  No. spec = number of specific; no. cat = number of categoric; AMs = 
autobiographical memories; man = manipulation. Standard deviations are 
presented between parentheses. For gender, 0 = female, 1 = male. ** p < .01. 
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Appendix C: Participant Pack  
1. Information sheets. 
i. Information sheet for phase one. 
Thank you for your interest in this study. My name is Laura Lanning. I 
am a postgraduate clinical psychology student at the University of Exeter. This 
study aims to investigate the relationship between goals, personality and 
autobiographical memory.  
This is a very important area of research because memory has not 
been investigated in this way before. Some research has shown that the way 
people feel about themselves can affect their memory.  
Your participation in this study will make a valuable contribution. Please 
read the following information about the study. If you are happy to take part 
then please click ‘continue to next page’ to go on and read the consent form. 
I would like you to complete this study in two steps; over 2 separate days: 
Step 1 (today): You will be asked to: 
 provide some general information about yourself including your age, 
gender, native language and email address so that further information 
can be emailed to you. 
 rate a list of 8 goal statements. 
 complete 2 questionnaires containing sets of statements which you will 
be asked to respond to. One will measure your mood and the other will 
measure the extent to which you experience ruminative thoughts. 
Step 2:  This will happen in approximately 1 week, at the University of 
Exeter in the Washington Singer Building, Streatham Campus (room and time 
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details will be discussed between us and decided via email). There you will be 
asked to: 
 complete 2 autobiographical memory tests. During these tests some 
words will be presented to you on a computer screen and after each 
one you will be given 60 seconds in which to generate a memory. 
 generate and think about a personal goal for approximately 10 minutes. 
 rate 8 words. 
 complete some mood and self-focus ratings. 
 watch 2 short YouTube videos. 
Participation in this study should take approximately one hour, spread 
across steps 1 and 2.  
If you are an undergraduate psychology student you will be presented 
with 1.5 course credits for taking part in this study; 0.5 will be allocated for 
taking part in step 1 and a further 1 credit allocated for step 2.  
You are under no obligation to take part in this study, especially if it 
makes you feel uncomfortable in any way. For example, being asked to 
generate some personal goals or memories may cause you to feel upset or 
distressed.  
The study findings will be written up and reported (a thesis) in part 
completion of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. In accordance with 
University of Exeter Open Research Exeter policy, the thesis will be stored 
electronically at the University of Exeter, and will be accessible online (open 
access). The study findings might also be written up for publication in research 
journals and presented at conferences. The published journal article will also 
be available online (open access, University of Exeter).  
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I would like to make it clear that the information you give me will be 
treated with strict confidentiality. After I have contacted you using your 
university email address this will be deleted on 10th March 2014. Your name 
will not be used in connection with the results in any way. 
After you have completed the study you will be shown a debriefing 
form. The results of this study will not be fed back to you individually. 
However, if you would like to receive further information about the results then 
please contact me using the details on the debriefing form. Thank you very 
much for your help.   
If you are happy to take part then please click the 'continue to next page' 
button to proceed to the Informed Consent form. 
Laura  
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Appendix C: Participant Pack 
1. Information sheets. 
ii. Information sheet for phase two. 
Thank you for taking part in step 2 of this study. To remind you, my name 
is Laura Lanning and I am a postgraduate clinical psychology student at the 
University of Exeter. This study aims to investigate the relationship between 
goals, personality and autobiographical memory.  
This is a very important area of research because memory has not been 
investigated in this way before. Some research has shown that the way people 
feel about themselves can affect their memory.  
Your participation in this study will make a valuable contribution. Please 
read the following information about the study. If you are happy to take part 
then please click “continue to next page” to go on and read the consent form. 
Step 2: Today you will be asked to: 
 complete 2 autobiographical memory tests. During these tests some 
words will be presented to you on a computer screen and after each 
one you will be given 60 seconds in which to generate a memory. 
 generate and think about a personal goal for approximately 10 minutes. 
 rate 8 words. 
 complete some mood and self-focus ratings. 
 watch 2 short YouTube videos. 
Participation in this part of the study should take approximately 40 minutes. 
You are under no obligation to take part in this study, especially if it makes you 
feel uncomfortable in any way. For example, being asked to generate some 
personal goals or memories may cause you to feel upset or distressed.  
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The study findings will be written up and reported (a thesis) in part 
completion of a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. In accordance with 
University of Exeter Open Research Exeter policy, the thesis will be stored 
electronically at the University of Exeter, and will be accessible online (open 
access). The study findings might also be written up for publication in research 
journals and presented at conferences. The published journal article will also 
be available online (open access, University of Exeter).  
I would like to make it clear that the information you give me will be 
treated with strict confidentiality. After I have contacted you using your 
university email address this will be deleted on 10th March 2014. Your name 
will not be used in connection with the results in any way. 
After you have completed the study you will be shown a debriefing 
form. The results of this study will not be fed back to you individually. 
However, if you would like to receive further information about the results then 
please contact me using the details on the debriefing form. Thank you very 
much for your help.   
If you are happy to take part then please click the “continue to next page” 
button to proceed to the Informed Consent form. 
Laura  
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Appendix C: Participant Pack 
2. Informed consent forms. 
i. Informed consent form for phase one. 
Title of research:  Mood, personal goals and memory. 
Investigators: Laura Lanning, supervised by Dr Nick Moberly (Senior Lecturer). 
Research is affiliated with the University of Exeter. 
Purpose of research: To investigate the relationship between goals, 
personality and autobiographical memory.  
Description of procedures: 
Step 1: On day 1, online, you will be: 
 presented with 3 questionnaires containing sets of statements which 
you will be asked to respond to. 
 asked to rate a list of 8 goal statements.  
Step 2: On day 2, one week later, at the University of Exeter in the 
Washington Singer Building (Streatham Campus) you will be asked to: 
 complete 2 autobiographical memory tests. 
 generate and think about a personal goal for approximately 10 minutes. 
 talked through an exercise during which you generate and think about a 
personal goal. 
 rate a set of words. 
 complete some mood and self-focus ratings. 
 Watch 2 short YouTube clips. 
Participation in this study (steps 1 and 2) should take approximately one hour.  
  140 
Being asked about personal goals and autobiographical memories may cause 
you to feel upset or distressed. If you are not comfortable answering any 
questions, you can withdraw from the study at any time.   
Now please read the following statements and only click "continue to next 
page" if you understand and agree with them. I understand that: 
 This study will take approximately one hour to complete and will be 
spread across 2 days, 1 week apart. 
 My participation in this study will be completely anonymous; my name 
will not be used in connection with the results in any way. 
 I am free to withdraw my participation at any time during the study and 
for any reason; I can do this by alerting Laura. 
 If I am an undergraduate psychology student I will be offered 0.5 course 
credits for taking part in step 1 of this study and another 1 course credit 
for taking part in step 2. 
 I will also be offered the chance to discuss the DClinPsy application 
process with Laura and other trainee Clinical Psychologists. Details can 
be arranged after study completion. 
 There is no penalty for not taking part or for choosing to leave the 
experiment after starting the tasks. I will still be allocated 0.5 course 
credits for taking part in step 1 and 1 credit for taking part in step 2. 
 I will not be reimbursed for travelling to take part in this study. 
 I can choose to withdraw my data at a later date. I will need to provide 
Laura with my participant number to do this as it will not be connected 
to my name in any way. The deadline for doing this is 20th March 2015. 
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 The University of Exeter will own the data that I provide by participating 
in this study. 
 After the study has been completed all data will be archived and stored 
in accordance with the University’s Open Access Policy. This means 
that data will be made available to other post-graduate researchers. 
However, my data will remain anonymised. 
 I have the right to obtain information about the findings of the study and 
about how they will be used after the study is complete. Individual 
feedback cannot be provided, but the overall results will be published at 
a later date. 
 Some tasks may cause me to feel mildly distressed, but I can choose 
not to continue with the study if I feel uncomfortable at any point. If I feel 
at all sad or distressed following participation in this study, I can contact 
Laura for advice and support. 
By clicking "continue to next page" you are confirming your agreement with the 
above statements and are proceeding to start the questionnaires. 
  
  142 
Appendix C: Participant Pack 
2. Informed consent forms. 
ii. Informed consent form for phase two. 
Title of research: Mood, personal goals and memory. 
Investigators: Laura Lanning, supervised by Dr Nick Moberly (Senior Lecturer). 
Research is affiliated with the University of Exeter. 
Purpose of research: To investigate the relationship between goals, 
personality and autobiographical memory.  
Description of procedures:   
Step 2: Today you will be asked to: 
 complete 2 autobiographical memory tests. 
 generate and think about a personal goal for approximately 10 minutes. 
 talked through an exercise during which you generate and think about a 
personal goal. 
 rate a set of words.  
 complete some mood and self-focus ratings. 
 Watch 2 short YouTube clips. 
Participation in this part of the study should take approximately 40 mins.  
Being asked about personal goals and autobiographical memories may cause 
you to feel upset or distressed. If you are not comfortable answering any 
questions, you can withdraw from the study at any time.   
Now please read the following statements and only click "continue to next 
page" if you understand and agree with them. I understand that: 
 My participation in this study will be completely anonymous; my name 
will not be used in connection with the results in any way. 
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 I am free to withdraw my participation at any time during the study and 
for any reason; I can do this by alerting Laura. 
 If I am an undergraduate psychology student I will be offered 1 course 
credit for taking part today. 
 I will also be offered the chance to discuss the DClinPsy application 
process with Laura and other trainee Clinical Psychologists. Details can 
be arranged after study completion. 
 There is no penalty for not taking part or for choosing to leave the 
experiment after starting the tasks. I will still be allocated 1 credit for 
taking part today. 
 I will not be reimbursed for travelling to take part in this study. 
 I can choose to withdraw my data at a later date. I will need to provide 
Laura with my participant number to do this as it will not be connected 
to my name in any way. The deadline for doing this is 20th March 2015. 
 The University of Exeter will own the data that I provide by participating 
in this study. 
 After the study has been completed all data will be archived and stored 
in accordance with the University’s Open Access Policy. This means 
that data will be made available to other post-graduate researchers. 
However, my data will remain anonymised. 
 I have the right to obtain information about the findings of the study and 
about how they will be used after the study is complete. Individual 
feedback cannot be provided, but the overall results will be published at 
a later date. 
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 Some tasks may cause me to feel mildly distressed, but I can choose 
not to continue with the study if I feel uncomfortable at any point. If I feel 
at all sad or distressed following participation in this study, I can contact 
Laura for advice and support. 
 By clicking "continue to next page" you are confirming your agreement 
with the above statements and are proceeding to start the 
questionnaires. 
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Appendix C: Participant Pack 
3. Debriefing form (for both phases). 
Thank you very much for completing step 1 of this study. If you feel upset or 
distressed as a result of taking part in this online study I recommend that you 
contact one of the following helplines: 
Student Counselling Service 
The Counselling Service is available free of charge to all students, full-time, 
part-time, undergraduate and postgraduate. Because student life can be 
stressful, the Counselling Service is there to provide confidential help and 
support. We aim to help students cope more effectively with any personal 
problems or emotional difficulties that may arise during their time at University. 
 
Telephone (to book an appointment): (01392) 264381 
Email: counselling@exeter.ac.uk 
Website: http://services.exeter.ac.uk/counselling/about.html 
 
Student Counselling Service (opening hours: 9.30 – 1.00pm, 2 – 5pm) 
Reed Hall, Hailey Wing 
Streatham Drive 
Exeter EX4 4PD 
 
VOICE (University of Exeter) 
Voice is a student run listening and information service, run by students for 
fellow students at the University of Exeter and is available from 8pm to 8am 
every night during term time. It is completely confidential, anonymous and 
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prejudice-free, which means you can call with the confidence of knowing you 
can discuss anything you want without being judged. 
Telephone (8pm – 8am): 4000 (internal, free of charge) 
External: (01392) 275284 
Website: http://www.exetervoice.co.uk/ 
 
Exeter Samaritans 
Samaritans provides confidential emotional support, 24 hours a day for people 
who are experiencing feelings of distress or despair. Samaritans are there if 
you're worried about something, feel upset or confused, or you just want to talk 
to someone. 
 
10 Richmond Road 
Exeter 
Devon 
EX4 4JA (open 10.30am – 9.30pm Mon–Sat, 1.30pm – 9.30pm Sun) 
 
24 hour telephone helpline: 01392 411711 (Exeter branch) / 08457 909090 
(national) 
Email: jo@samaritans.org 
Website: http://www.exetersamaritans.org/ 
 
Depression Alliance 
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Depression Alliance is a charity working to relieve and to prevent depression 
by providing information, support and understanding. Depression Alliance 
offers a range of publications and self-help groups. 
Depression Alliance 
20 Great Dover Street 
London 
SE1 4LX 
 
Telephone: 0845 123 23 20 (for an information pack only) 
Email: information@depressionalliance.org 
Website: http://www.depressionalliance.org/ 
 
In order to collect your 0.5 course credit please email me the password 
“Christmas” and I will allocate this on SONA. In order to complete step 2 of the 
study to earn a further 1 course credit please email me: 
Laura Lanning: LL308@exeter.ac.uk 
Alternatively, and/or if you have any further questions please contact either 
myself, or my supervisor (Dr Nick Moberly) using the contact details below: 
Dr Nick Moberly: n.j.moberly@exeter.ac.uk 
An explanation of the purpose of this study will be provided after you have 
completed stage 2. I will be unable to give individual feedback, but if you wish 
the overall results of this study can be fed back to within the next year. If you 
would like to receive this information please contact me using the email 
address I have provided.  
My sincere thanks again for agreeing to participate in this study. Laura 
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Appendix D: Ethics Documentation 
1. University ethics approval for empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee 
 
Psychology, College of 
Life & Environmental 
Sciences 
 
Washington Singer Laboratories 
Perry Road 
Exeter 
EX4 4QG 
 
Telephone +44 (0)1392 724611  
Fax +44 (0)1392 724623 
Email Marilyn.evans@exeter.ac.uk 
 
 
To: Laura Lanning 
From: 
CC: 
Cris Burgess 
Nicholas Moberly 
Re: Application 2013/510 Ethics Committee 
Date: February 26, 2016 
 
The School of Psychology Ethics Committee has now discussed your application, 2013/510  – 
Effect of goal discrepancy rumination on overgeneral memory .  The project has been 
approved in principle for the duration of your study. 
The agreement of the Committee is subject to your compliance with the British Psychological 
Society Code of Conduct and the University of Exeter procedures for data protection 
(http://www.ex.ac.uk/admin/academic/datapro/). In any correspondence with the Ethics 
Committee about this application, please quote the reference number above. 
I wish you every success with your research.  
 
 
Cris Burgess 
Chair of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
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Appendix D: Ethics Documentation 
2. University ethics approval for survey for generation of memory 
cues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee 
 
Psychology, College of Life 
& Environmental Sciences 
 
Washington Singer Laboratories 
Perry Road 
Exeter 
EX4 4QG 
 
Telephone +44 (0)1392 724611  
Fax +44 (0)1392 724623 
Email Marilyn.evans@exeter.ac.uk 
 
 
To: Laura Lanning 
From: 
CC: 
Cris Burgess 
Nicholas Moberly 
Re: Application 2013/519 Ethics Committee 
Date: February 26, 2016 
 
The School of Psychology Ethics Committee has now discussed your application, 2013/519 – 
Mood, personal goals and memory: Goal statement and cue selection and similarity 
ratings.  The project has been approved in principle for the duration of your study. 
The agreement of the Committee is subject to your compliance with the British Psychological 
Society Code of Conduct and the University of Exeter procedures for data protection 
(http://www.ex.ac.uk/admin/academic/datapro/). In any correspondence with the Ethics 
Committee about this application, please quote the reference number above. 
I wish you every success with your research.  
 
Cris Burgess 
Chair of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
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Appendix E: Dissemination Statement 
The results of this study will be disseminated to interested parties 
through feedback, journal publication and presentation.  
Dissemination to participants and NHS services.  
As stated on the participant information sheet participants the results of 
this study will not be fed back to participants individually. However, 
participants have been informed that they may contact myself using the 
contact details on the debriefing form should they wish to receive information 
about the results.  
Journal Publication  
It is expected that the study will be submitted for publication to Memory (five-
year impact factor 2.29). See Appendix B of literature review for instructions 
for authors. 
Presentation  
On 24th November 2015, my research findings were presented to an academic 
audience, for peer review, as part of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at 
the University of Exeter.  
 
 
